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ESSAY
Disclosing Prosecutorial Misconduct
Jason Kreag*
Prosecutorial misconduct in the form of Brady violations
continues to plague the criminal justice system. Brady misconduct
represents a fundamental breakdown in the adversarial process,
denying defendants a fair trial and undermining the legitimacy of the
criminal justice system. Commentators have responded by proposing a
range of reforms to increaseBrady compliance. Yet these reforms largely
ignore the need to remedy the harms from past Brady violations.
Furthermore, these proposals focus almost entirely on the harms
defendants face from prosecutors'Bradymisconduct, ignoringthe harms
victims, jurors, witnesses, and others endure because of Brady
misconduct. This Article proposes a new remedy to supplement the
current responses to Brady misconduct-the Brady Violation Disclosure
Letter. It proposes sending a concise letter documenting the misconduct
to the relevant stakeholders who participatedin the initial trial that was
corrupted by a Brady violation. This disclosure is a partialremedy for
the range of harms Brady violations create. It also promises to increase
Brady compliance and to promote transparency in a criminal justice
system that is increasingly opaque. Importantly, this proposal can be
implemented immediately without adopting new rules or statutes and
without expanding Brady's existing constitutionalprotections.
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INTRODUCTION

Andre Hatchett was exonerated in 2016 after spending twentyfive years in prison for a murder that he did not commit.' He proved his
innocence and regained his freedom after a reinvestigation uncovered
rampant police and prosecutorial misconduct in his case. The
misconduct included the prosecution's failure to disclose evidence that
was favorable to Hatchett in advance of trial in violation of Brady v.
Maryland.2 For example, prosecutors withheld information that the

1.
See Andre Hatchett, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/
andre-hatchett/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2018) [https://perma.cc/6VAQ-35DF] (describing Hatchett's
wrongful conviction and exoneration).
2.
373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963).
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only eyewitness to the crime initially identified someone other than
Hatchett as the perpetrator. 3
Terry Williams prevailed in his three-decade-long effort
challenging his death sentence in 2017.4 Unlike Hatchett, Williams
committed the murder in his case, yet he challenged his death sentence
and ultimately proved that the prosecution violated Brady in his case
as well. In Williams's case, the prosecution concealed evidence of the
extensive history of sexual abuse Williams, a juvenile at the time,
suffered at the hands of the man he killed.5 In vacating Williams's death
sentence, the court recognized that the jury should have been provided
the opportunity to consider this information when deciding whether
Williams deserved the death penalty.
This Article explores how the criminal justice system should
respond to Brady violations. It argues that the existing tools have
proven insufficient. 6 As such, it proposes adding a new option-the
Brady Violation Disclosure Letter. The letter is a concise, clear
statement memorializing the prosecutorial misconduct and its effect on
the case. To be most effective, the letter should be sent to participants
in the adjudicatory process-the jurors, witnesses, judge, prosecutor,
and defense attorney from the original trial; the victim of the
underlying crime; and relevant criminal justice organizations,
including victims' rights organizations, the public defender's office, the
local prosecutor's office, and the law enforcement agency that
investigated the case. 7 Publicly disclosing prosecutorial misconduct in
this manner promotes Brady compliance, validates the interests of the
range of people harmed by Brady misconduct, and increases
transparency. It is also a flexible tool that can be implemented
immediately without new laws, rules, or regulations.8 This flexibility is
thanks to individual judges possessing sufficient inherent authority to
implement this reform today.
Before exploring the details of this proposal, it is helpful to
return to Hatchett's and Williams's successful Brady claims. The paths
See Press Release, Brooklyn Dist. Attorney's Office, Brooklyn D.A. Moves to Vacate the
3.
Wrongful Conviction of Andre Hatchett Who Was Convicted of Murdering Acquaintance in 1991
in Bed-Stuy Park (Mar. 10, 2016), http://www.brooklynda.org/2016/05/10/brooklyn-d-a-moves-tovacate-the-wrongful-conviction-of-andre-hatchett-who-was-convicted-of-murdering-acquaintancein-1991-in-bed-stuy-park/ [https://perma.cclLJ3V-CSBT].
Commonwealth v. Williams, 168 A.3d 97, 97 (Pa. 2017) (per curiam) (vacating Williams's
4.
death sentence).
5.
Id. at 103-05 (Donohue, J., writing in support of affirmance) (summarizing the
undisclosed evidence).
See infra Part II.
6.
See infra Section III.A.
7.
See infra Sections III.B.4, III.B.5.
8.
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their cases weaved through the system give context as to why
responding to Brady violations with a targeted public disclosure of the
misconduct merits adoption.
The early signs of misconduct in Hatchett's case went
unexplored. In the months after his conviction, a conflict forced
Hatchett's first appellate attorney to withdraw from the case.9 The
conflict was that another attorney in the same defense agency
represented the prosecution's chief witness against Hatchett-the
purported eyewitness who claimed to see Hatchett commit the
murder. 10 When the appellate attorney handed the case to new counsel,
he referenced a deal the state's witness received for cooperating in
Hatchett's case." Hatchett's trial attorney had suspected the state's
witness received a deal but was unable to uncover evidence proving this
at trial. 12 The reference to a deal initially went unexplored, but it proved
to be an ominous marker of what was to come.
By 2008, Hatchett secured representation from The Innocence
Project, and he sought DNA testing of the physical evidence in his
case. 13 Hatchett's motion for DNA testing argued that the state's chief
witness was not reliable, in part because of the likelihood that he
received a deal in exchange for testifying.14 The DNA testing failed to
conclusively prove Hatchett's innocence. Despite this, Hatchett
persisted, focusing on investigating the possibility of a Brady violation.
Initially, the prosecution rebuked Hatchett's request for access to the
prosecutor's trial file to search for exculpatory evidence that had not
been disclosed. 15
Hatchett's prospects changed when Ken Thompson was elected
Brooklyn's District Attorney in 2013. Thompson created a robust
Conviction Review Unit willing to devote time and resources to
reviewing the reliability of old cases. 16 With a willing party on the other
9.
See Letter from Jonathan P. Willmott, Assoc. Appellate Counsel, Legal Aid Soc'y, to
Ursula Bentele, Professor, Brooklyn Law Sch. (July 1, 1994) (on file with author).
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. The author was one of Hatchett's attorneys at The Innocence Project. See Memorandum
of Law in Support of Motion for Post Conviction DNA Testing Pursuant to C.P.L. §440.30(1-a) at
1, People v. Hatchett, No. 3771/91, (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Kings Cty. Nov. 17, 2008) (on file with author).
14. Id. at 12-15.
15. See Laurie L. Levenson, Searching for Injustice: The Challenge of Postconviction
Discovery, Investigation, and Litigation, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 545, 547 (2014) ("There is generally no
right to discovery at the postconviction stage.").
16. See Rich Schapiro & Christina Carrega-Woodby, Man Wrongfully Convicted in '91 Murder
Walks Free, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 10, 2016, 5:51 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/newyork/brooklyn/man-wrongfully-convicted-91-brooklyn-murder-walk-free-article-1.2559747
[https://perma.cc/79Z5-AALG] (discussing the Conviction Review Unit).
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side, Hatchett's attorneys and the Brooklyn District Attorney's Office
cooperated on a thorough reinvestigation that uncovered extensive
misconduct and led to a joint motion to vacate Hatchett's conviction
based on his innocence.1 7 Without the cooperation of the prosecution,
18
Hatchett would likely still be fighting to prove his innocence.
Williams enjoyed no such cooperation from the Philadelphia
District Attorney's Office. Rather, he secured relief in spite of fierce
opposition at every turn. Williams's trial prosecutor, Andrea Foulkes,
had a history with Williams by the time she asked a jury to sentence
him to death. Months earlier, Foulkes unsuccessfully sought the death
19
penalty for another murder that Williams committed. Notably, the
jury in the first case heard testimony that the victim had a history of
sexually abusing Williams, who was seventeen years old at the time of
the murder. 20 Foulkes believed this was the reason Williams escaped
21
the death penalty in the first case.
Having failed to secure a death sentence in Williams's first case,
Foulkes ensured that the jury in the second case did not hear that the
22 Before
victim in that case had also sexually abused Williams.
disclosing witness statements from the state's key witnesses, Foulkes
"sanitized" the statements to omit any references to the victim's history
of sexually abusing young boys. 23 Foulkes also concealed information,
including "[her] own notes" documenting her knowledge of the victim's
pedophilia. 24 She exacerbated her misconduct in closing arguments
when, despite possessing evidence to the contrary, she argued that the

&

17. See Order Vacating Conviction and Dismissing Indictment, People v. Hatchett,
No. 3771/1991 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Kings Cty. Mar. 10, 2016) (on file with author); see also Schapiro
Carrega-Woodby, supra note 16 (quoting the Chief of the Conviction Review Unit describing
Hatchett's case as a "systemic failure, by every institution he encountered").
18. Schapiro & Carrega-Woodby, supra note 16 (quoting Barry Scheck, Codirector of the
Innocence Project, at Hatchett's exoneration: "We are incredibly grateful to District Attorney Ken
Thompson and his conviction integrity unit, without which Mr. Hatchett may never have received
justice.").
19. See generally Marc Bookman, IWhen a Kid Kills His Longtime Abuser, Who's the Victim?,
MOTHER JONES (Nov. 30, 2015, 11:00 AM), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/11/terrywilliams-philadelphia-death-penalty-sexual-abuse/ [https://perma.cc/VC2U-BB33] (providing an
account of Williams's background, crimes, and history with the Philadelphia District Attorney's
Office).
20. Commonwealth v. Williams, 168 A.3d 97, 100 (Pa. 2017) (Donohue, J., writing in support
of affirmance).
21. Id. (citing the Nov. 27, 2012 findings of Judge M. Teresa Sarmina in Williams's 2012
postconviction proceedings).
22. Id. (quoting the Nov. 27, 2012 findings of Judge Sarmina in Williams's 2012
postconviction proceedings as follows: "The major difference between the [first and second] cases
is that evidence of a sexual relationship between the middle-aged victim and [Williams] was
presented to the jury in the first, but not in the second." (second alteration in original)).
23. Id. at 103-04.
24. Id. at 104.
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victim "was a 'kind' and 'innocent' man who had done nothing more than
offer Williams a ride home" before Williams killed him. 2 5 Having not
heard that Williams's victim had sexually abused him, the jury
returned a death sentence. 26
In 2012, the scope of the Brady misconduct started to take shape
when Williams's codefendant agreed to talk to Williams's attorneys,
telling them how, before trial, the prosecution shaped his testimony so
as not to mention the sexual abuse Williams faced at the hands of the
victim.

2 7

This new information

caused the court to inspect the

prosecution and police files, and the review confirmed the prosecution's
multiyear effort to conceal evidence Williams could have used to avoid
the death penalty. 28 The court found that these actions violated Brady
and ordered a new sentencing hearing for Williams. 29
After the initial findings of Brady misconduct were made in each
case, Hatchett's and Williams's cases again diverged. Hatchett's
prosecutors publicly began to right the wrong. They confessed error,
joined Hatchett in moving to vacate his conviction, and publicly
described the Brady violations in the case. 30 Conversely, Williams's
prosecutors dug in, challenging any suggestion that they committed
misconduct. 3 1 They asked the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to reinstate
Williams's death sentence, knowing that they likely had at least one
supporter on the court. 32 Chief Justice Ronald Castille was the elected
prosecutor at the time of Williams's trial, and he personally approved
seeking the death penalty against Williams. 33

25. Id. at 98 (quoting prosecutor Andrea Foulkes's closing arguments).
26. Id.
27. See Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1904 (2016) (recounting that the
codefendant also revealed that he had received a previously undisclosed benefit from the
prosecution in exchange for his cooperation against Williams); Williams, 168 A.3d at 103
(Donohue, J., writing in support of affirmance) (quoting the codefendant's affidavit alleging the
misconduct).
28. See Williams, 168 A.3d at 103-05 (Donohue, J., writing in support of affirmance)
(summarizing the undisclosed evidence and its importance).
29. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1904.
30. See Brooklyn Dist. Attorney's Office, supra note 3 ("Upon reviewing the conviction, the
[Conviction Review Unit] found that the defendant was deprived of his due process rights based
on several issues, including Brady violations.").
31. See generally Laurie L. Levenson, The Problem With Cynical Prosecutor's Syndrome:
Rethinking a Prosecutor'sRole in Post-Conviction Cases, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 335, 338 (2015)
("I have consistently witnessed senior prosecutors to be among the most resistant to believing their
office made a mistake and one of their colleagues has helped convict an innocent person."); Daniel
S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: ProsecutorialResistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84
B.U. L. REV. 125, 136-37 (2004) (discussing prosecutors' incentives for opposing postconviction
claims for relief).
32. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1904.
33. Id. at 1903-04.
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Chief Justice Castille did not disappoint. He refused to recuse
himself.34 And when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reinstated
Williams's death sentence, Chief Justice Castille issued a concurring
opinion in which he concluded that it was the postconviction judge, not
35
the assistant prosecutor, who committed intentional misconduct. He
failed to offer even the slightest criticism of the trial prosecutor, who,
even under the most generous interpretation, misrepresented the facts
to the jury by characterizing Williams's victim as a "kind" and
"innocent" man despite knowing he had a history of sexually abusing
36
Williams and other young men.

Chief Justice Castille and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did
not have the last word, however. The U.S. Supreme Court rebuked
Justice Castille, holding that he should have recused himself from the
case. 37 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then vacated Williams's death
38
sentence because of the prosecution's Brady misconduct.
Hatchett's conviction and Williams's death sentence were
ultimately vacated because of the prosecutors' Brady misconduct. This
Article asks what the criminal justice system should do to remedy
Brady misconduct, other than merely vacating convictions and
sentences. The current options for responding to Brady misconduct
range from barring retrial, to comprehensive and independent
investigations into the causes of the misconduct, to pursuing
professional discipline or criminal sanctions against prosecutors who
commit misconduct. 39 These responses focus almost exclusively on the
harms to the defendant and the possible punishment of the prosecutor.
They overlook harms to other stakeholders, including jurors, the victim
of the underlying crime, and witnesses. 40 More importantly, each
response has limitations. Courts are reluctant to bar retrial as a
34. Id. at 1904 ('Without explanation, Chief Justice Castille denied the motion for recusal
and the request for its referral [to the full court].").
35. Commonwealth v. Williams, 105 A.3d 1234, 1245-46 (Pa. 2014) (Castille, J., concurring),
vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016). Chief Justice Castille characterized the postconviction judge's
actions that uncovered the favorable evidence in the prosecutor's file as "lawless," unfair, and
misinformed about the scope of due process protections. Id. In an ironic twist given his decision
not to recuse himself from the case, Chief Justice Castille accused the postconviction judge of not
remaining "neutral." Id. at 1245.
36. See id. at 1245 (dismissing Williams's prosecutorial misconduct claims as "frivolous"); id.
at 1251 (dismissing as "slander[ous]" Williams's claim that his jury should have been aware of the
victim's history of sexual abuse of Williams and other juveniles).
37. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1908 (finding that Chief Justice Castille's "significant, personal
involvement in Williams' case gave rise to an unacceptable risk of actual bias").
38. Commonwealth v. Williams, 168 A.3d 97, 97 (Pa. 2017) (per curiam) (affirming Williams's
sentencing-phase relief as a result of an equally divided Pennsylvania Supreme Court).
39. See infra Part II.
40. See infra Section III.B.2 (explaining how Brady violations harm jurors, victims, and trial
witnesses).
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response to Brady misconduct, 4 1 independent investigations are
extremely costly, 4 2 and prosecutors rarely face official discipline for
Brady misconduct. 43 This means that the customary response to a
finding of Brady misconduct is usually limited to vacating the
defendant's conviction or sentence, as was done in Hatchett's and
Williams's cases.
We can do more to respond to Brady misconduct, particularly if
we move beyond the inflexible and costly responses currently available.
Brady Violation Disclosure Letters represent one option that can be
implemented immediately. These letters promise to validate the harms
victims, witnesses, and jurors face from participating in trials corrupted
by Brady misconduct. They also increase transparency and help repair
the damage Brady misconduct causes to the integrity of the criminal
justice system. To be certain, Brady Violation Disclosure Letters are
only a partial remedy for Brady misconduct and are offered as a
supplement, not a replacement, for existing options. Yet they deserve
sufficient consideration to ensure that Brady is not an underenforced
constitutional right that results in tragedies like Hatchett's wrongful
conviction and Williams's ill-gotten death sentence. 44
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I outlines the scope of the
Brady doctrine. Part II describes the current responses and remedies
for Brady violations and discusses their limitations. In Part III, I
introduce the Brady Violation Disclosure Letter and explain why it
should be used to remedy Brady violations. This Part explores how the
adoption of Brady Violation Disclosure Letters will help to increase
compliance with Brady going forward and serve as a remedial measure
to address the wide range of harms caused by Brady violations. Finally,
Part IV addresses the likely criticisms of this proposal.
I. THE BRADY DOCTRINE

The Brady doctrine arises from a long line of cases in which the
Supreme Court interpreted the Due Process Clause to ensure fair
proceedings in criminal cases and to protect innocent defendants.4 5 The
41. See infra Section II.A.
42. See infra Section II.C (summarizing the scope and cost of the investigation of the
prosecutorial misconduct in the prosecution of Senator Ted Stevens).
43. See infra Section II.B (identifying limitations of relying on professional discipline for
responding to Brady misconduct).
44. See Cynthia E. Jones, A Reason to Doubt: The Suppressionof Evidence and the Inference
of Innocence, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415, 434 (2010) ("[he Brady disclosure duty has
become one of the most unenforced constitutional mandates in the criminal justice system.").
45. See id. at 422-23 ("The purpose of the Brady rule is to ensure that the defendant receives
a fair trial in which all relevant evidence of guilt and innocence is presented to enable the fact-
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Court has explained that these two aims-fair process and protecting
innocence-are important both to protect individual defendants facing
the power of the state and to maintain society's faith in the integrity of
the criminal justice system. 46
Brady identifies the defendant's constitutional right to receive
evidence or information that is favorable to the defense and material to
guilt or punishment from prosecutors before trial.4 7 Evidence or
information is favorable if it is exculpatory or if it impeaches the

finder to reach a fair and just verdict."); Colin P. Starger, Expanding Stare Decisis: The Role of
Precedent in the Unfolding Dialecticof Brady v. Maryland, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 77, 108 fig.1 (2012)
(mapping Brady's "due process roots").
46. See Starger, supra note 45, at 127 (identifying the "twin justifications for the Brady Rule"
as fairness and justice, meaning "a constitutional commitment to protecting innocence and
apprehending the guilty"); see also Jason Kreag, Letting Innocence Suffer: The Need for Defense
Access to the Law Enforcement DNA Database,36 CARDOZO L. REV. 805, 831-37 (2015) (describing
how these two roles grew out of the Due Process Clause).
47. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that "suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused . . . violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment"). Prosecutors' Brady obligations are part of a larger
discovery regime in criminal cases. See Darryl K. Brown, Discovery, in 3 REFORMING CRIMINAL
2017),
ed.,
Luna
(Erik
153
147,
PROCESSES
TRIAL
AND
PRETRIAL
JUSTICE:

http://academyforjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Reforming-Criminal-JusticeVol 3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HL9V-M3EF] ("Aside from constitutional duties defined by Brady, most
disclosure law resides in statutes, procedural rules, and court orders."); id. at 155-58
(summarizing the various ways states impose nonconstitutional discovery rules); Ben Grunwald,
The FragilePromise of Open-FileDiscovery, 49 CONN. L. REV. 771, 778-79 (2017) (describing states
with narrow and broad rule-based criminal discovery regimes).
In addition to Brady's constitutional protections, prosecutors also must comply with discovery
provisions in the rules of criminal procedure and their ethical duties. In some jurisdictions, the
procedural rules and ethical obligations extend the prosecutor's disclosure obligations beyond
Brady. See Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 470, n.15 (2009) ("Although the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted by Brady, only mandates the disclosure of material
evidence, the obligation to disclose evidence favorable to the defense may arise more broadly under
a prosecutor's ethical or statutory obligations." (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8(d)
(AM. BAR ASS'N 1983))); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436-37 (1995) (observing that Brady
"requires less of the prosecution than the ABA Standards"); Schultz v. Comm'n for Lawyer
Discipline of the State Bar of Tex., No. 55649, 2015 WL 9855916, at *1 (Tex. Bd. Disciplinary App.
Dec. 17, 2015) (concluding that the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct are "broader than Brady");
ABA Comm'n on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 (2009):
A prosecutor's constitutional obligation extends only to favorable information that is
"material," i.e., evidence and information likely to lead to an acquittal.... Rule 3.8(d)
is more demanding than the constitutional case law, in that it requires the disclosure
of evidence or information favorable to the defense without regard to the anticipated
impact of the evidence or information on a trial's outcome.;
Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, The Ethics of ProsecutorialDisclosure, 30 CRIM. JUST. 41, 4142 (2015) (discussing how Model Rule 3.8(d) has been interpreted by some jurisdictions as
requiring more than Brady's constitutional rule). But see Disciplinary Counsel v. Kellogg-Martin,
923 N.E.2d 125, 130 (Ohio 2010) (imposing a Brady-like materiality standard on prosecutor's
ethical disclosure obligations).
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prosecutor's evidence.4 8 Brady does not impose a duty on prosecutors to
take investigative steps to uncover all evidence or information
favorable to the defense. But when prosecutors and the agencies under
their control possess favorable evidence or information, they are
obligated to disclose that evidence or information. 49
Evidence is material, and thus subject to disclosure, when its
nondisclosure undermines confidence in the reliability of the
defendant's conviction or sentence.5 0 Because the prosecutor's Brady
duty must be met before trial, Brady's materiality provision requires
prosecutors to make a prediction about the nature of the favorable
evidence without full knowledge of the defendant's case.5 1 The Supreme
Court recognizes that this materiality determination is often tricky and
complex in practice. 52 As such, the Court has repeatedly advised
prosecutors to err on the side of disclosure. 53 Despite this advice, the
Court has also made clear that Brady compliance does not turn on the
prosecutor's intent. 54

48. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) ("Impeachment evidence, however,
as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule."); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
150, 153-54 (1972) (holding that Brady applies to impeachment evidence).
49. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 ("[T]he individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable
evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police.").
50. See id. at 434 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678).
51. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 701 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing Brady's materiality
prong because it requires "the prosecutor to predict what effect various pieces of evidence will have
on the trial"); In re Kline, 113 A.3d 202, 208 (D.C. 2015) ("Retrospective analysis, while it
necessarily comports with appellate review, is wholly inapplicable in pretrial prospective
determinations.").
52. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976) (recognizing that the pretrial
materiality determination is "inevitably imprecise" in part because "the significance of an item of
evidence can seldom be predicted accurately until the entire record is complete"); see also United
States v. Safavian, 233 F.R.D. 12, 16 (D.D.C. 2005) ("Most prosecutors are neither neutral (nor
should they be) nor prescient, and any such judgment [on materiality] necessarily is speculative
on so many matters that simply are unknown and unknowable before trial begins.
); In re
Kline, 113 A.3d at 208 (explaining the futility of using the materiality standard in the pretrialdisclosure setting).
53. See Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 470, n.15 (2009) ("As we have often observed, the prudent
prosecutor will err on the side of transparency, resolving doubtful questions in favor of
disclosure."); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 439 ("[A] prosecutor anxious about tacking too close to the wind
will disclose a favorable piece of evidence."); Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108 ("[The prudent prosecutor will
resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure.").
54. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110:
Nor do we believe the constitutional obligation is measured by the moral culpability, or
the willfulness, of the prosecutor. If evidence . . . of innocence is in his file, he should be
presumed to recognize its significance . . . . If the suppression of evidence results in
constitutional error, it is because of the character of the evidence, not the character of
the prosecutor.
(internal citations and footnotes omitted).
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Despite being settled law for over fifty years, noncompliance
55
with Brady's constitutional protections persists. Commentators have
56
Knowledge of the
offered several explanations for this persistence.
actual rate of Brady misconduct remains elusive, however, because it is
57
unknown how often Brady violations go uncovered. The absence of an
agreed-upon base rate for how often prosecutors violate Brady often
leads proponents and opponents of Brady reform to disagree about
58
whether Brady violations are an epidemic or merely episodic.
Regardless, Brady violations should command our attention because
known Brady misconduct inflicts deep scars on the criminal justice
system.
The scars from Brady misconduct represent wrongful
convictions of innocent defendants, including innocent defendants sent
59
They represent
to death row because of prosecutorial misconduct.
the wrong
pursued
prosecutors
harms endured by victims as
perpetrator in trials corrupted by misconduct while the actual
perpetrator remained free. 60 They represent harms jurors and
witnesses faced when they realized that they unknowingly participated

55.

See BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT viii (2d ed. 2017) ("[A]cts of

misconduct by prosecutors are recurrent, pervasive, and very serious."); Jason Kreag, The Jury's
Brady Right, 98 B.U. L. REV. 345, 355-58 (2018) (describing scope of Brady misconduct); see also
infra notes 278-281 (explaining that the instances of known Brady misconduct likely
underestimate the actual rate of misconduct, as some instances of misconduct are likely never
uncovered).

56. See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Improving ProsecutorialDecision Making: Some Lessons of
Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1609 (2006) ("The fallibility of human cognition
raises especially disturbing questions about a prosecutor's ability to determine whether evidence
is exculpatory."); Jones, supra note 44, at 433 ("Other than the unenforceable 'honor code,' there
are few incentives for prosecutors to comply with Brady because there is no meaningful judicial
oversight of the process.").
57.

See BRANDON

L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 168 (2011) ("By its nature,

misconduct involving concealed evidence may remain hidden. We typically do not know what
prosecutors had in their files, much less what they failed to show to the defense."); Alex Kozinski,
Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, xxiii (2015) ("Prosecutorial misconduct
is a particularly difficult problem to deal with because so much of what prosecutors do is secret.").
58. See United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting)
("Brady violations have reached epidemic proportions in recent years .... ). But see infra
Section IV.B (summarizing arguments from opponents of reform that Brady violations are rare).
59.

See, e.g., BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY: A STORY OF JUSTICE AND REDEMPTION (2014)

(discussing Walter McMillian's exoneration from death row); Sam Roberts, John Thompson,
Cleared After 14 Years on Death Row, Dies at 55, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/04/obituaries/John-thompson-cleared-after- 14-years-on-deathrow-dies-at-55.html [https://perma.cc/6KBZ-46UM] (describing Thompson's exoneration and the
prosecutorial misconduct that caused it).
60. See Dist. Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 99 (2009)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Crime victims, the law enforcement profession, and society at large
share a strong interest in identifying and apprehending the actual perpetrators of vicious
crimes.").
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in the prosecutor's misconduct. 61 They represent harms prosecutors
faced when they discovered that their competitive and adversarial
nature resulted in misconduct. 62 And they represent the harm resulting
from the public questioning the very integrity of the criminal justice
system. 63 The system should respond to all of these harms when Brady
misconduct is uncovered. However, as the next Part explains, the
current responses to Brady violations leave many of these harms
unaddressed.
II. CURRENT RESPONSES TO BRADYVIOLATIONS ARE INSUFFICIENT
Uncovering a Brady violation in an individual case produces
significant results for an individual defendant-his conviction or
sentence is wiped away. Often, the extent of the misconduct and the
weight of the favorable evidence uncovered render a retrial or
resentencing unlikely, meaning the defendant is released and the case
ends. 64
But the impact of the Brady violation on the criminal justice
system as a whole is usually muted, representing only a momentary
blip on the public's consciousness that is quickly forgotten.6 5 This is due,
in part, to the limited responses currently available when Brady
misconduct is uncovered. The responses to Brady violations range from
doing nothing other than ordering relief for the defendant to the often
prohibitively costly comprehensive, independent investigation of the
prosecutors responsible for the misconduct. Options between these two
extremes include barring retrial; investigations initiated by attorney
disciplinary bodies; civil suits; and, in a small number of jurisdictions,
61. See Kreag, supra note 55, at 374-87 (proposing a separate Brady-like right in the jury to
remedy harms jurors face).
62. See, e.g., A.M. "Marty" Stroud III, Lead ProsecutorApologizes for Role in Sending Man to
Death Row, SHREVEPORT TIMES (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.shreveporttimes.com/story/opinion/
readers/20 15/0 3 /2 0/lead-prosecutor-offers-apology-in-the-case-of-exonerated-death-row-inmateglenn-ford/25049063/ [https://perma.cc/3V9R-KWCH] (confessing to misconduct that resulted in
Glenn Ford's death sentence).
63. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (recognizing that Brady violations
"corrupt[ ] ... the truth-seeking function of the trial process"); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds
contempt for law. . . .").
64. See supra notes 1-44 and accompanying text (discussing Hatchett's exoneration). In other
cases, retrial is not practical even if prosecutors remained committed to the defendant's guilt. See
Stephanos Bibas, Brady v. Maryland: From Adversarial Gamesmanship Toward the Search for
Innocence, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 129, 136-37 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) [hereinafter
Bibas, Brady] (describing Brady's release from death row after a retrial proved impractical). And
in instances of extreme misconduct, some courts bar retrial. See infra Section II.A.1.
65. See Jones, supranote 44, at 441 ("[T he suppression of Brady evidence is treated with the
triviality of a lost rag doll, when it should be treated with the exigency of an asthma attack.").
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the possibility of criminal charges against the bad actors. In a given
case, these responses to Brady misconduct may overlap; an independent
investigation may lead to professional discipline. Nonetheless, the
current responses each have limitations. This Part identifies those
limitations. Part III then introduces the Brady Violation Disclosure
Letter as a new and supplemental way to respond to prosecutorial
misconduct.
A. ProhibitingRetrial
Although the vast majority of Brady violation findings result in
vacating the defendant's conviction, thus leaving it to the prosecutor's
discretion to determine whether to retry the case, in a small number of
cases courts bar retrial altogether. 66 This response, although limited to
the four corners of the defendant's case, signals the severity of the
misconduct and carries the potential to influence prosecutorial behavior
in other cases.
Debra Milke's capital case in Arizona is a recent example of how
barring retrial can capture the attention of prosecutors and the public.6 7
The court barred Milke's retrial after finding "egregious prosecutorial
misconduct" in the form of extensive Brady violations. 68 The Maricopa
County Attorney's Office responded forcefully, asking the court to
depublish its order. 69 The prosecutor was not the only person who took
70
notice. Milke's release from death row was covered internationally,
and the court's order barring retrial generated similar media

66. See id. at 446 ("Although legal scholars and jurists have proposed Brady reforms that
strongly encourage the expanded use of dismissal as a sanction for intentional violations, those
reforms have not been adopted by state and federal courts.").
67.

See generally GARY L. STUART, ANATOMY OF A CONFESSION: THE DEBRA MILKE CASE

(2016); Matthew Ashton, Note, The Milke Way: Milke v. Ryan and the Vast Galaxy of Uncharted
Exculpatory Evidence It Revealed, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 1061 (2017).
68. Milke v. Mroz, 339 P.3d 659, 662 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) (citing the "integrity of our system
ofjustice" to bar retrial because of the "egregious prosecutorial misconduct"). The Arizona Supreme
Court declined to review the ruling of the intermediate appellate court barring retrial. See Milke v.
Ryan, 711 F.3d 998, 1019 (9th Cir. 2013) (reversing conviction based on Brady violations).
69. See Kozinski, supra note 57, at xxv n.129 (discussing the misconduct and the prosecutor's
effort to cover up the misconduct by requesting the appellate court to depublish its opinion); Press
Release, Maricopa Cty. Attorney's Office, County Attorney Comments on Arizona Supreme Court
Ruling in State v. Milke (Mar. 17, 2015), https://www.maricopacountyattorney.org/
CivicAlerts.aspx?AID=313 [https://perma.cc/AS7Z-GWFA] (calling the order barring Milke's
retrial a "dark day for Arizona's criminal justice system").
70. See Arizona Death Row Inmate Debra Milke Released to Await Retrial, GUARDIAN (Sept.
7, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/07/arizona-death-row-inmate-debra-milke
[https://perma.ccl9Z53-YWB8]; Greg Botelho, Debra Milke, Arizona Woman Who Had Murder
Conviction Tossed, Is Freed, CNN (Sept. 6, 2013, 8:14 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/06/
justice/arizona-milke-release/index.html [https://perma.cc/7GAH-JBK9].
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coverage.7 1 As such, the attention generated by the order produced some
benefits similar to Brady Violation Disclosure Letters. 72 Specifically,
the media coverage cast a brighter light on the initial misconduct.
Ironically, the prosecutor's reaction attacking the ruling likely focused
even more attention on the underlying misconduct. In an increasingly
private criminal justice system, particularly with respect to
prosecutorial
decisionmaking,
media
attention
promotes
transparency.7 3 Furthermore, it is likely that some prosecutors took
notice of the misconduct and fallout from it, perhaps making them more
likely to comply with Brady when faced with similar cases. But Milke's
case is not representative of the typical result of most Brady violations;
judges are often reluctant to impose such an extreme remedy as barring
retrial.74
Furthermore, barring retrial after Brady misconduct does not
address some of the other benefits offered by Brady Violation Disclosure
Letters. For example, while barring retrial responds to the defendant's
interests and potentially increases deterrence by capturing the
attention of prosecutors regarding the importance of complying with
Brady, it does not address or remedy other harms. The victim,
witnesses, and jurors from the initial trial likely suffered harms from
participating in a corrupted process. 75 Barring retrial does not vindicate
their interests.

71. See Saeed Ahmed & Greg Botelho, Debra Milke, Who Spent 22 Years on Arizona Death
Row, Has Murder Case Tossed, CNN (Mar. 24, 2015, 3:49 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/03/24/
justice/arizona-debra-milke-death-sentence/index.html
[https://perma.cclSA9X-VL65]; Arizona
Drops Murder Charges Against Debra Milke, BBC NEWS (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.bbc.coml
news/world-us-canada-30443351 [https://perma.cc/AHE5-QBKJ]; No Second Murder Trial for
Arizona Woman Held 22 Years in Son's Death, CBS NEWS (Dec. 11, 2014, 11:45 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/no-second-murder-trial-for-arizona-woman-debra-jean-milkeheld-22-years-in-sons-death/ [https://perma.cc/5HPK-X4AM].
72. See infra Section III.B (discussing benefits of Brady Violation Disclosure Letters).
73. See infra Section III.B.3 (discussing the rationale for Brady Violation Disclosure Letters);
see also Ashton, supra note 67, at 1074 (discussing options for how prosecutors should respond to
misconduct finding in Milke's case).
74. See, e.g., D'Ambrosio v. Bagley, 688 F. Supp. 2d 709, 726 (N.D. Ohio 2010) ("[W]hile a
federal court has the power to prevent the state from attempting to reprosecute a successful habeas
petitioner, such power is only exercised appropriately in extraordinary circumstances."). Short of
barring a retrial, in limited instances, courts have ordered a prosecutor's office recused or barred
certain penalties-for example barring the pursuit of a death sentence-because of prosecutorial
misconduct. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera-Clemente, No. 11-499, 2012 WL 12911051, at *1
(D.P.R. Sept. 19, 2012) (precluding death penalty following prosecution's discovery violations);
People v. Dekraai, 210 Cal. Rptr. 3d 523, 527-28 (Ct. App. 2016) (affirming trial court's order
recusing Orange County District Attorney's Office based on extensive prosecutorial misconduct).
75. See infra Section III.B.2.
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B. ProfessionalDiscipline
The attorney disciplinary system represents a second option for
responding to Brady misconduct. Professional conduct rules recognize
the special status of prosecutors in the criminal justice system.7 6 They
explain that prosecutors are "minister [s] of justice and not
simply . . advocate [s]."77 The Supreme Court has repeatedly
78
recognized the special role prosecutors play in the pursuit of justice.
And prosecutors embrace this role.79 Accompanying this exalted role are
rules of professional conduct that are unique to prosecutors, including
an explicit professional conduct rule regarding prosecutors' disclosure
obligations.8 0 Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8(d) states that
prosecutors "shall"
make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the
prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in
connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged
mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of
81
this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal.

Notably, in many jurisdictions, prosecutors' ethical disclosure
obligations reach beyond the constitutional requirements demanded by
Brady.82 And where they do not, the ethical obligations reach at least
as far as prosecutors' constitutional duties. 83 Thus, Brady violations are
also ethical violations, rendering the attorney disciplinary process a
possible avenue for responding to Brady misconduct.

76. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015) (describing the special
responsibilities of a prosecutor); CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION

§ 3-1.2(b) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015) ("The primary duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice within the
bounds of the law, not merely to convict."); AM. BAR ASS'N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATIONS 1 (3d ed. 2014) ("As a nation, we do not expect prosecutors to be
typical advocates. We expect them to hold truth, justice, and mercy more sacred than winning.").
77.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015).

78. See Bankes v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 696 (2004) ("We have several times underscored the
'special role played by the American prosecutor in the search for truth in criminal trials.'" (quoting
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999))); see also People v. Hill, 17 Cal. 4th 800, 820 (1998)
("A prosecutor is held to a standard higher than that imposed on other attorneys because of the
unique function he or she performs in representing the interests, and in exercising the sovereign
power, of the state.").
79.

NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS

§ 1-1.1

(NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS'N 2009) ("The

prosecutor is an independent administrator of justice. The primary responsibility of a prosecutor
is to seek justice, which can only be achieved by the representation and presentation of the truth.").
80.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8(d) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015).

81. Id.
82. See supra note 47.
83. See, e.g., In re Ronald Seastrunk, 236 So. 3d 509, 510 (La. 2017) (holding that Louisiana's
ethical disclosure obligations are "coextensive" with Brady); Disciplinary Counsel v. KelloggMartin, 923 N.E.2d 125, 130 (Ohio 2010) (imposing a Brady-like materiality standard on
prosecutors' ethical disclosure obligations).
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The Supreme Court endorses using the attorney disciplinary
process as the primary means for responding to Brady violations. 84 For
example, after John Thompson narrowly avoided execution and
ultimately secured his freedom after uncovering prosecutors' Brady
violations, he successfully sued the prosecutors for his wrongful
conviction. 85 Ultimately, the Supreme Court overturned the jury's
finding in favor of Thompson, vacating the $14 million it awarded him. 86
In so doing, the Court explained that it was unfair to hold the elected
prosecutor liable for failure to train his assistant prosecutors because
the need for training on disclosure obligations was not obvious. 7 Why
was it not obvious? The Court reasoned that the elected prosecutor
could rely on the fact that the assistant prosecutors were subject to
professional conduct rules that required the disclosure of Brady
evidence.8 8 The clear implication was that the Court believed that
prosecutors' desire to avoid professional discipline sufficiently
motivates them to understand and comply with Brady.89
Despite the initial appeal and the Supreme Court's endorsement
of using the attorney disciplinary process to respond to Brady
violations, policing prosecutorial compliance with Brady in this manner

84. See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 263 (1988) (recognizing that
referral to disciplinary authorities as opposed to dismissing a criminal case was preferable where
the prosecutorial misconduct did not prejudice the defendant); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
428-29 (1976) (arguing that the possibility of professional discipline is a sufficient alternative to
civil liability to deter prosecutorial misconduct); id.:
[A] prosecutor stands perhaps unique, among officials whose acts could deprive persons
of constitutional rights, in his amenability to professional discipline by an association
of his peers. These checks undermine the argument that the imposition of civil liability
is the only way to insure that prosecutors are mindful of the constitutional rights of
persons accused of crime.;
see also Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession's Failure to Discipline Unethical Prosecutors, 36
HOFSTRA L. REV. 275, 309 (2007) ("Strengthening the disciplinary process should be a top priority
for reform because the United States Supreme Court has identified this process as the appropriate
remedy for prosecutorial misconduct.").
85. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 54 (2011) (noting that the district court jury awarded
Thompson $14 million).
86. Id. at 72.
87. Id. at 67 ("A licensed attorney making legal judgments, in his capacity as a prosecutor,
about Brady material simply does not present the same 'highly predictable' constitutional danger
as Canton'suntrained officer.").
88. Id. at 66 ("Among prosecutors' unique ethical obligations is the duty to produce Brady
evidence to the defense.").
89. Id. ("An attorney who violates his or her ethical obligations is subject to professional
discipline, including sanctions, suspension, and disbarment."); id. at 67 ("A district attorney is
entitled to rely on prosecutors' professional training and ethical obligations in the absence of
specific reason, such as a pattern of violations, to believe that those tools are insufficient to prevent
future constitutional violations . . . .").
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90
has proven ineffective for several reasons. First, attorney disciplinary
authorities often do not learn of instances of prosecutorial misconduct.
Several factors contribute to this, including insufficient funding for
disciplinary bodies; prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys failing
to report instances of misconduct; and reporting practices skewed
91
Prosecutors may
against defendants whose guilt appears certain.
colleagues. 92
protect
to
effort
an
in
choose not to report misconduct
Judges may fear making enemies or may simply be reluctant to initiate
94
investigations. 93 Defense attorneys may seek to protect future clients.

90. See, e.g., David Keenan et al., The Myth of ProsecutorialAccountability After Connick v.
Thompson: Why Existing Professional Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect Against
ProsecutorialMisconduct, 121 YALE L.J. FORUM 203, 209 (2011) (describing lack of discipline for
prosecutors who violate Brady); Kevin C. McMunigal, Prosecutorial Disclosure Violations:
Punishments vs. Treatment, 64 MERCER L. REV. 711, 713 (2013):
Lack of negative consequences for violations of the disclosure obligation imposed by
Brady and its ethics counterpart in Rule 3.8(d) of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct has long been a chronic problem in our criminal justice system.... [E]thics
authorities generally have been reluctant to impose disciplinary sanctions on
prosecutors who fail to disclose.;
Richard A. Rosen, DisciplinarySanctionsAgainst Prosecutorsfor Brady Violations:A Paper Tiger,
65 N.C. L. REV. 693 (1987).
91. See Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorsand ProfessionalRegulation, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
873 (2012); Kevin C. McMunical, The (Lack of) Enforcement of Prosecutor Disclosure Rules, 38
HOFSTRA L. REV. 847 (2010). But see Bruce Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial
Accountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51, 78-79 (2016) (recognizing that "the institutions
that play a significant role in professional regulation ... have slowly begun to expand their role in
overseeing prosecutors").
92. See AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 76, at 190:
A strong bond often develops among those working together in criminal
investigations. . . . In this environment, information about potential misconduct by an
investigator or fellow prosecutor raises a significant challenge to all involved. There
may be a tendency to diminish the significance of, or to demand extraordinary proof
about, information concerning potential misconduct as a way to avoid its impact on the
matter at hand, and on personal and institutional relationships.
93. See, e.g., Oral Argument at 28:25, Baca v. Adams, 773 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-2sCUrhgXjH4 [https://perma.cclXWC7-MK8V] (questioning by
Judge Wardlow expressing that judicial elections contribute to pressure on state judges to avoid
finding prosecutorial misconduct harmful); H. Mitchell Caldwell, The Prosecutor Prince:
Misconduct, Accountability, and a Modest Proposal, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 51, 82 (2013) ("Because
prosecutors wield significant power and influence over local criminal justice communities, both
judges and defense counsel are often concerned about the possible backlash that a report of
misconduct might generate."); Peter A. Joy & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Ethics in CriminalAdvocacy, in
THE STATE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 163, 166 (2015) (recounting how after a trial court judge declared
unethical the Queens County District Attorney's Office's practice of conducting pre-arraignment
interviews with defendants, the "Queens District Attorney call[ed] for the judge's removal from
the bench").
94. See Lara A. Bazelon, Hard Lessons: The Role of Law Schools in Addressing Prosecutorial
Misconduct, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 391, 433 (2011) ("In opening a class discussion about defense
counsel's Rule 8.3 reporting obligation, clinical instructors might begin with the empirical fact that
very few defense attorneys report prosecutors who commit misconduct to the state bar or any other
disciplinary authority."); Green, supra note 91, at 888 (recognizing "the conventional assumption
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In each instance, the decision to report potential misconduct is likely
undermined where the defendant's guilt seems more certain. 95
Even when prosecutorial misconduct is reported to disciplinary
authorities, prosecutors often go unpunished. 96 This is at least in part
due to the difficulty in determining when prosecutorial actions breach
ethical boundaries. 9 7 But perhaps it is more than an interpretation
problem. Professor Fred C. Zacharias noted that in setting a high bar
for disciplining prosecutors, disciplinary authorities might have been
balancing the Sixth Amendment's demand of zealous advocacy from
defense attorneys and the fact that the rules of professional conduct
provide defense attorneys a wider range of acceptable behavior.9 8
Ultimately, while professional discipline remains an option for
responding to Brady misconduct, there is good reason not to consider it
a complete solution. 99 The professional disciplinary system has resulted
in allowing even high-profile, intentional misconduct to go
unpunished. 100 Furthermore, disciplining the prosecutor does not
vindicate the harms victims, witnesses, and jurors shouldered because
of their participation in trials corrupted by Brady misconduct.
C. Comprehensive Independent Investigations
The most comprehensive response to findings of prosecutorial
misconduct is through an independent investigation administered by

that lawyers under-report, rather than over-report, prosecutors' misconduct in order to stay in
prosecutors' good graces for their own and future clients' benefit").
95. See J. Thomas Sullivan, Brady Misconduct Remedies: Prior Jeopardy and Ethical
Discipline of Prosecutors, 68 ARK. L. REV. 1011, 1056 (2016) (noting that attorney disciplinary
proceedings to respond to prosecutorial misconduct may be particularly fruitless "when the
aggrieved party [defendant] . .. has been convicted of a heinous offense, or is otherwise not blessed
with pristine character, untarnished reputation, or simply lack of recognized status within the
community").

96. See supra note 91.
97. See Davis, supra note 84, at 284 ("[1Much of the language of Rule 3.8 is vague and subject
to interpretation, providing very little guidance to prosecutors and making it difficult to sustain
complaints against prosecutors before disciplinary authorities.").
98. Fred C. Zacharias, The ProfessionalDisciplineof Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 754
(2001) (noting that reluctance to discipline prosecutors may result from disciplinary authorities
concluding that "aggressive defense lawyer conduct justifies reciprocation by prosecutors").
99. But cf. Bruce A. Green & Samuel J. Levine, DisciplinaryRegulation of Prosecutors as a
Remedy for Abuses of ProsecutorialDiscretion:A Descriptiveand Normative Analysis, 14 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 143, 155-63 (2016) (describing instances where "state courts have exercised
disciplinary authority in response to instances of prosecutorial misconduct"); Samuel J. Levine,
The PotentialUtility of DisciplinaryRegulation as a Remedy for Abuses of ProsecutorialDiscretion,
12 DuKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 1 (2016) (examining disciplinary rules as a tool to regulate
prosecutors' charging decisions).
100. See Goeke v. Dept. of Justice, 122 M.S.P.R. 69, 80-81 (2015) (vacating the suspensions
imposed on Senator Stevens's prosecutors).
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an experienced body with adequate resources. This was the path taken
by Judge Emmet Sullivan following the exposure of multiple Brady
violations in the prosecution of Alaska Senator Ted Stevens.10 1
In December 2008, just over two months after Senator Stevens's
trial, an FBI agent involved in the case raised concerns that the case
was propelled by prosecutorial misconduct. 102 This tip caused Judge
Sullivan-who by that time already had good reason to question the
prosecutors' compliance with Brady10 3-to review the prosecutors'
discovery decisions. When the prosecutors failed to cooperate, Judge
Sullivan held three of them in contempt.104 The Department of Justice
("DOJ") appointed new prosecutors, and they quickly uncovered
significant undisclosed Brady information. 105 On April 1, 2009, the DOJ
asked the court to set aside the jury's verdict because of the Brady
misconduct.1 0 6 Judge Sullivan dismissed the prosecution with prejudice
a week later.10 7
The case could have ended there. Alaska's Attorney General had
already publicly confessed error and signaled the start of an internal
review of the prosecutors' misconduct.10 8 But Judge Sullivan was not
satisfied. Rather, he appointed a prominent member of the bar to
conduct a thorough investigation to determine whether prosecutors
committed criminal contempt in violating Brady.109 This resulted in an
unprecedented two-year investigation that ended with an over fivehundred-page report summarizing the findings.11 0 While the
101. Department of Justice prosecutors charged Senator Stevens with violating federal ethics
laws regarding gifts he allegedly received during a home renovation project. See Indictment,
United States v. Stevens, 593 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 1), 2008 WL 284791. See generally
Emmet G. Sullivan, Enforcing Compliance With Constitutionally-Required Disclosures: A
Proposed Rule, 2016 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 138 (discussing his response to the Brady
misconduct).
102. Report to Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan of Investigation Conducted Pursuant to the Court's
Order, dated April 7, 2009 at 32, In re Special Proceedings, 825 F.Supp.2d 203 (D.D.C. Mar. 15,
2012) (No. 09-0198), 2012 WL 858523 [hereinafter Report to Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan].
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See United States v. Stevens, No. 08-cr-231 (EGS) 2009 WL 6525926 (Apr. 7, 2009) (order
vacating verdict and dismissing indictment with prejudice).
107. Id.
108. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Statement of Attorney General Eric Holder
Regarding United States v. Theodore F. Stevens (Apr. 1, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/opalpr/
statement-attorney-general-eric-holder-regarding-united-states-v-theodore-f-stevens
[https://perma.cc/GZD2-JPZ6].
109. See Sullivan, supra note 101, at 140.
110. See Report to Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan, supra note 102, at 1 ("The investigation lasted
two years and required the examination and analysis of well over 128,000 pages of documents,
including the trial record, prosecutors' and agents' emails, FBI 302s and handwritten notes, and
depositions of prosecutors, agents and others involved in the investigation and trial."). The District
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investigation did not end with criminal contempt charges against the
prosecutors, it concluded:
The investigation and prosecution
were permeated by the systematic concealment of
significant exculpatory evidence which would have independently corroborated Senator
Stevens's defense and his testimony, and seriously damaged the testimony and credibility
of the government's key witness. 1 1 1

The investigation confirmed that the Brady misconduct was
intentional.112
The comprehensive investigation and public release of findings
provided a detailed analysis of the misconduct in the case. This would
not have happened had Judge Sullivan simply vacated the jury's guilty
verdict without further action. Instead, by shining a light on the details
of the misconduct, the results of the investigation cast a shadow over
the criminal justice system as a whole. If such blatant, intentional
misconduct can occur in a case involving a powerful defendant,
experienced private defense attorneys, an attentive judge, and highlevel DOJ prosecutors, Brady noncompliance deserves our attention.
In addition to driving the public's attention to the issue of Brady
misconduct, the detailed investigation produced some reforms. For
example, despite insisting that the misconduct was "not typical" 113 and
opposing external reforms, 114 the DOJ instituted several reforms after
the misconduct came to light. These reforms included issuing three
internal memoranda clarifying prosecutors' discovery obligations,
appointing a permanent National Criminal Discovery Coordinator,
updating internal training guidelines to require annual discovery
training, and holding several new internal training seminars
addressing prosecutors' discovery obligations.1 1 5 It is unclear how
effective these reforms have been, but there is reason for cautious
optimism that they may improve Brady compliance. 116

Court rejected efforts to keep the report documenting the misconduct private. See In re Special
Proceedings, 842 F.Supp.2d 232, 235 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that "[t]o deny the public access to Mr.
Schuelke's Report ... would be an affront to the First Amendment and a blow to the fair
administration of justice").
111. Report to Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan, supra note 102, at 1.
112. Id. at 28 ("[O]ur investigation found evidence which compels the conclusion, and would
prove beyond a reasonable doubt, that other Brady information was intentionally withheld from
the attorneys for Senator Stevens . . . .").
113. Hearingon the Special Counsel's Report on the Prosecutionof Senator Ted Stevens Before
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 2 (2012) [hereinafter DOJ Statement for the Record]
(statement for the record from the DOJ).
114. Id. at 5-7 (describing the DOJ's opposition to legislation proposed to reform discovery
practices).
115. Id. at 2-5 (describing the DOJ's internal reforms).
116. See Ellen Yaroshefsky & Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors'Ethics in Context: Influences on
ProsecutorialDisclosure, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 269,
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A comprehensive and independent investigation of Brady
misconduct is an appealing remedy. 117 But investigations are expensive.
The special prosecutor who investigated Senator Stevens's case and his
firm were paid nearly $1 million alone. 118 This does not include other
direct costs, including the time and resources the DOJ consumed in
responding to and cooperating with the investigation. In addition, there
are the opportunity costs to the court, the special prosecutor, and the
DOJ. Judge Sullivan was no doubt aware of these costs when he
initiated the investigation. But not all judges will make the same call
as Judge Sullivan. Even judges concerned about Brady compliance may
pursue a less costly response.
D. Civil Liability
Civil suits against prosecutors for Brady misconduct remain a
possibility for defendants whose constitutional rights were violated;
however, the Supreme Court has drastically limited the likelihood of
success in these suits. This is primarily due to the immunity
prosecutors enjoy. When acting in their prosecutorial capacity,
prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil suits even for intentional
misconduct. 119 Prosecutors retain absolute immunity from suits arising
from prosecutors' administrative decisions if the decisions are "directly
connected with the prosecutor's basic trial advocacy duties." 120 Thus,
absolute immunity is retained in suits alleging that prosecutors failed
to implement a system to meet their duty to disclose impeachment
evidence. 121 If the lawsuit arises from a prosecutor performing
270 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather eds., 2012) (noting the importance of office culture in
prosecutors' pretrial disclosure decisions).
117. See Harry Mitchell Caldwell, Everybody Talks About ProsecutorialConduct but Nobody
Does Anything About It: A 25-Year Survey of ProsecutorialMisconduct and a Viable Solution, 2017
U. ILL. L. REV. 1455, 1482 (proposing an independent prosecutorial review panel with the power
to "deliver a range of sanctions, including private reprimand, public reprimand, fines, suspensions,
and disbarment").
118. Emily Heil, Ted Stevens' Case: Probe into Prosecutors'Mistakes Cost Nearly $1 Million,
WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.comlblogs/in-the-loop/post/ted-stevensscase-probe-into-prosecutors-mistakes-cost-nearly-1-milion/2012/03/30/glQALbdTIS-blog.html?
utm-term=.5cfb5f7Oc29e [https://perma.cc/2YC4-TB3K].
119. See Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 343 (2009) ("In the years since Imbler, we
have held that absolute immunity applies when a prosecutor prepares to initiate a judicial
proceeding .... ); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976) ("We hold only that in initiating
a prosecution and in presenting the State's case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for
damages under § 1983.").
120. Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 346.
121. See id. at 349 ("[W]here a § 1983 plaintiff claims that a prosecutor's management of a
trial-related information system is responsible for a constitutional error . . . the prosecutor
responsible for the system enjoys absolute immunity just as would the prosecutor who handled the
particular trial itself.").
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investigative duties or administrative duties not closely related to
prosecuting cases, however, the prosecutor retains only qualified
immunity.122
John Thompson's case is a dramatic example of how difficult it
is for defendants to use civil suits as a remedy for Brady misconduct.
Despite the jury finding in favor of Thompson and holding the
prosecutor liable for his wrongful conviction, the Supreme Court
overturned the verdict. 123 Thompson sued, asserting that the Orleans
Parish District Attorney's Office was liable because it failed to provide
adequate training to its line prosecutors concerning their Brady
obligations. 124 To succeed, the Supreme Court required Thompson to
demonstrate the District Attorney's deliberate indifference to the need
for training, a finding which implies a requirement that the District
Attorney had notice of the need for training. 12 5 The Court concluded
that Thompson did not meet this burden because (1) he did not
demonstrate a pattern of Brady violations that would have put the
District Attorney on notice of the need to train line prosecutors on
Brady's reach, and (2) the Brady violation against Thompson was not
the obvious result of the District Attorney's failure to train line
prosecutors because it was reasonable for the District Attorney to
presume that the line prosecutors knew and understood Brady as a
result of their legal training and professional obligations. 126
These holdings effectively extinguish civil liability against
prosecutors as a way to remedy Brady misconduct. In the rare case,
defendants may succeed in civil claims. But even in these cases the
public is often left in the dark about the extent of the Brady misconduct.
For example, Hatchett settled his civil suit and was awarded $12
million. 12 7 Because of the settlement, however, the extent of the
misconduct was never described in a public trial.

122. See id. at 342 ("[A]bsolute immunity may not apply when a prosecutor is not acting as 'an
officer of the court,' but is instead engaged in, say, investigative or administrative tasks.").
123. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 54 (2011).
124. Id.
125. See id. at 61 (" 'Deliberate indifference' is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof
that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action." (quoting Bd. of
Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997))).
126. See id. at 62 ("A pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is
'ordinarily necessary' to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train
[liability]." (quoting Bd. of Comm'rs, 520 U.S. at 409)); id. at 66 ("In light of this regime of legal
training and professional responsibility, recurring constitutional violations are not the 'obvious
consequence' of failing to provide prosecutors with formal in-house training about how to obey the
law." (quoting Bd. of Comm'rs, 520 U.S. at 409)).
127. Andrew Keshner, Man Who Spent 25 Years in Prison After Wrongful Murder Conviction
to Collect $12M from City, N.Y. DAILY NEwS (Oct. 4, 2017), http://www.nydailynews.com/newyork/wrongful-murder-conviction-cost-city-12m-article-1.3539897 [https://perma.cc/4U7P-DY4T].
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E. CriminalProsecutions
Finally, a small number of jurisdictions have experimented with
criminal sanctions for prosecutorial misconduct. 128 In 2011, North
Carolina amended its discovery statute to add criminal penalties for
129
prosecutors who willfully violate their discovery obligations.
Depending on the type of violation, North Carolina prosecutors could
face felony or misdemeanor charges. 130 In January 2017, California also
criminalized some instances of intentional prosecutorial misconduct,
13
with a possible punishment of up to three years in prison. 1
While the mere existence of potential criminal sanctions might
have the intended effect of increasing prosecutorial compliance with
North Carolina's and California's discovery rules, I have not confirmed
a single case in either jurisdiction in which a prosecutor faced criminal
prosecution for intentional disclosure violations. Perhaps this is not
32
surprising given that the laws are limited to intentional misconduct
and charging a prosecutor under these statutes necessarily pits

128. Notably, forty years ago the Supreme Court referenced criminal prosecutions as a way to
regulate prosecutors. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428-29 (1976):
We emphasize that the immunity of prosecutors from liability in suites under § 1983
does not leave the public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs.
This Court has never suggested that the policy considerations which compel civil
immunity for certain governmental officials also place them beyond the reach of the
criminal law.
129. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN § 15A-903(d) (West 2018):
Any person who willfully omits or misrepresents evidence or information required to be
disclosed pursuant to subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of this section, or required to be
provided to the prosecutor's office pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, shall be
guilty of a Class H felony. Any person who willfully omits or misrepresents evidence or
information required to be disclosed pursuant to any other provision of this section shall
be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.
The statute places reciprocal obligations on defense attorneys to disclose certain information to
prosecutors and imposes similar penalties on defense attorneys for violations of the statute. See
id.
130. Id.
131. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 141(c) (West 2018):
A prosecuting attorney who intentionally and in bad faith alters, modifies, or withholds
any physical matter, digital image, video recording, or relevant exculpatory material or
information, knowing that it is relevant and material to the outcome of the case, with
the specific intent that the physical matter, digital image, video recording, or relevant
exculpatory material or information will be concealed or destroyed, or fraudulently
represented as the original evidence upon a trial, proceeding, or inquiry, is guilty of a
felony punishable by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 for 16
months, or two or three years.
132. See id. (limiting felonious misconduct to instances of intentional misconduct motivated
by bad faith); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN § 15A-903(d) (limiting the statute's reach to willful
misconduct).

320

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1:297

prosecutor against prosecutor. 133 Nonetheless, other jurisdictions may
follow North Carolina and California in at least providing the
possibility of criminal liability for prosecutorial misconduct. Until then,
or until North Carolina or California takes a more active approach,
prosecutors in most jurisdictions can remain confident that they will
not face criminal penalties even for intentional Brady violations.
III. THE BRADY VIOLATION DISCLOSURE LETTER
This Article advocates a new response to Brady misconduct: the
public disclosure of prosecutorial misconduct through a Brady Violation
Disclosure Letter. This remedy is designed to supplement rather than
replace the existing options for responding to Brady misconduct that
are outlined in Part II. Brady misconduct causes a range of harms to
individuals beyond the discrete harms defendants face. It also causes
deep harm to the criminal justice system as a whole. Furthermore,
increasing compliance with Brady has proven complex, challenging,
and expensive. Responses to Brady violations should reflect the range
of harms these violations cause and the complexity and challenge of
altering prosecutorial behavior. The Brady Violation Disclosure Letter
addresses the harms left untouched by the current responses to Brady
misconduct. It is also a flexible option, easily adaptable to the range of
protections Brady guarantees. Furthermore, this reform can be
implemented today in any size jurisdiction 34 without reinterpreting the
Constitution, passing new laws, changing the rules of criminal
procedure, or giving judges additional authority.
This Part outlines the important components of Brady Violation
Disclosure Letters and suggests best practices for implementation. It
then examines why this reform is a promising remedial measure for
defendants and others harmed by Brady violations, a deterrent for
prosecutorial misconduct, and a force for transparency in a system that
is increasingly opaque.

133. See Gretel Kauffman, Is California's New Law a Model for Curbing Prosecutorial
Misconduct?, CHRISTIAN ScL.
MONITOR
(Oct. 5,
2016),
https://www.csmonitor.com/
USA/Justice/2016/1005/Is-California-s-new-law-a-model-for-curbing-prosecutorial-misconduct
[https://perma.ccJG6Y-S57Z] (quoting Professor Bennett Gershman as saying, "You're asking
prosecutors to enforce a law against prosecutors, and that's a little bit tricky. You don't know
whether prosecutors will have the stomach, the will, or the interest in investigating other
prosecutors.").
134. See infra notes 231, 234-236 and accompanying text.
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A. Essential Components of Brady Violation Disclosure Letters
It is helpful to return to Hatchett's and Williams's cases to
introduce Brady Violation Disclosure Letters. Upon finding police and
prosecutorial misconduct during the reinvestigation of Hatchett's case,
the prosecutor joined Hatchett in asking the court to vacate the
conviction and dismiss the indictment. With the parties in agreement,
the court signed a short, four-sentence order ending the case. 13 5 The
court's order provided no explanation for why it vacated Hatchett's
murder conviction, stating only that its decision was based on the
"defendant's oral Motion to Vacate and the People's response." 136 In
order for an outsider-that is, someone who was not integrally involved
in the reinvestigation, including the victim's family and the witnesses
and jurors from the initial, corrupted trial-to understand the extent of
the misconduct, that person must have attended the hearing.
Alternatively, an outsider could attempt to piece together media
accounts of the exoneration or to parse the civil suit Hatchett filed after
he was exonerated.1 37
In Williams's case, courts extensively discussed the Brady
misconduct in several published opinions.13 8 Collectively, the opinions
explained how the prosecution concealed evidence demonstrating that
the man Williams killed had sexually abused him and other young men
before Williams responded with lethal force. 139 However, the discussion
of the misconduct in these lengthy opinions was mixed with analysis of
complex procedural rules, constitutional interpretation, and judicial

135. Order Vacating Conviction and Dismissing Indictment, supra note 17.
136. Id. In its entirety, the order reads:
Defendant moves to vacate his conviction pursuant to C.P.L. § 440.10.1(g). In
determining this motion, the court has heard defendant's oral Motion to Vacate and the
People's response.
The Court grants the defendant's Motion to Vacate. Accordingly, the judgment of
conviction and sentence in the above-captioned matter is vacated.
Further, based on their representation that they no longer have sufficient evidence
to prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the People's Motion to Dismiss
the indictment is granted. Accordingly, the indictment is dismissed and sealed.
This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.
137. See supra notes 1-44 and accompanying text (summarizing Hatchett's exoneration and
the misconduct that led to it); see also Complaint and Jury Demand, Hatchett v. New York,
(E.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 17-cv-1324), 2017 WL 6729456.
138. Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1908 (2016), remanded to 168 A.3d 97;
Commonwealth v. Williams, 168 A.3d 97, 107-12 (Pa. 2017); Commonwealth v. Williams, 105 A.3d
1234, 1242-45 (Pa. 2014), vacated 136 S Ct. 1899 (2016); see supra notes 1-44 and accompanying
text (summarizing the misconduct in Williams's case).
139. See supra notes 1-44 and accompanying text (describing the Brady misconduct in
Williams's case).

322

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1:297

ethics regulations, all sprinkled with legal jargon. 140 Working through
the opinions to understand the gist of the Brady misconduct would be a
challenge even for attorneys skilled in complex criminal litigation. It
would be overwhelming for the average person without legal training.
As in Hatchett's case, an outsider could obtain some information about
the prosecutorial misconduct in Williams's case by reviewing the media
coverage. 141 This Section proposes an alternative to relying on media to
read between the lines-as was required in Hatchett's case-or to
summarize the legal jargon-as was required in Williams's case.
As envisioned here, a Brady Violation Disclosure Letter is a
concise and clear statement explaining the Brady misconduct to the
relevant stakeholders from the initial corrupted trial. The Brady
Violation Disclosure Letter should offer something between the
conclusory order in Hatchett's case and the detailed factual analysis in
the opinions in Williams's case. And, where possible, the disclosure
should avoid legal jargon, instead opting for a more accessible
explanation. The court that found the misconduct should draft the letter
and direct the clerk to distribute it to all stakeholders from the initial
trial, including the victim, jurors, witnesses, prosecution and defense
attorneys, and the law enforcement officers who investigated the crime.
In addition to these individuals, the clerk should distribute the Brady
Violation Disclosure Letter to the heads of various agencies, including
the elected prosecutor, public defender, police chief, sheriff, and
directors of any victims' rights organization in the community.
Substantively, there are ten essential components of a Brady
Violation Disclosure Letter.142 The disclosure should:
1. be an official statement, ordered and written by the court that
found the misconduct and distributed to the relevant
stakeholders by the clerk;
2. provide a brief summary of the trial, including the date of
conviction, crime of conviction, and the role the stakeholder
receiving the letter played in the trial;
3. summarize the prosecutor's constitutional obligation to provide
the defendant with favorable evidence before trial and explain
that this constitutional right helps ensure reliable verdicts and
the fairness of the system in practice and perception;

140. See Williams, 136 S. Ct. 1899; Williams, 168 A.3d at 97; Williams, 105 A.3d 1234.
141. See Bookman, supra note 19.
142. The Appendix contains a sample Brady Violation Disclosure Letter based on Hatchett's
case.
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4. state that the prosecutor violated the defendant's constitutional
right 43 and identify the favorable information the prosecutor
concealed, adding that the prosecutor's concealment left the
court without sufficient confidence in the justness, fairness, or
reliability of the conviction or sentence;
5. indicate the implications of the constitutional violation on the
defendant's case-e.g., that the court vacated the defendant's
conviction and/or sentence;
6. state that the prosecutor retains the power to reprosecute the
defendant;
7. include an update on the defendant's custodial status-i.e.,
whether the defendant was released from prison or remained in
custody awaiting a possible new trial;
8. state that the letter's purpose is to increase the transparency of
the criminal justice system and serve as a partial remedy to
stakeholders who unknowingly participated in a trial corrupted
by prosecutorial misconduct and that any possible punishment
for the prosecutors responsible for the misconduct may be
pursued in other proceedings;
9. list the other people and institutions who received notice of the
misconduct; and
10. express the court's gratitude for the recipient's participation in
the initial trial and state that the letter does not obligate the
recipient of the letter to take any action.
Although the benefits of Brady Violation Disclosure Letters are
most readily achieved when the disclosure is made in an official
statement distributed by the court, this proposal is designed to be
flexible, recognizing that there are alternative implementation methods
that still provide some benefits. That is, even if the court chose not to
direct the clerk to distribute a concise letter summarizing the
misconduct, other entities could step in as messenger. 144 For example,
some chief prosecutors may elect to be proactive in the face of
misconduct, publicly confessing error.1 45 Former Attorney General Eric
143. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
144. Adam M. Gershowitz, ProsecutorialShaming: Naming Attorneys to Reduce Prosecutorial
Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059, 1097 (2009) (proposing that "law schools establish
Prosecutorial Misconduct Projects that would review appellate decisions finding prosecutorial
misconduct" and "identify[] misbehaving prosecutors that appellate judges are unwilling to
name").
145. Cf. Russell M. Gold, Beyond the JudicialFourth Amendment: The Prosecutor's Role, 47
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1591, 1594-95 (2014) ("Although courts do not exclude all unconstitutionallyobtained evidence, prosecutors as executive officers should refrain from introducing evidence that
they conclude was unconstitutionally obtained without regard to judicial admissibility-a duty of
administrative suppression."); Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV.
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Holder did this in Senator Stevens's case when he publicly conceded
misconduct and asked the court to dismiss the case. 146 In another
example, the prosecutor responsible for Glen Ford's conviction and
death sentence in Louisiana publicly confessed his Brady misconduct in
a letter to the editor following Ford's exoneration and release from
death row. 147 The motivations for publicly confessing, error may be
complex and potentially contradictory. 1 4 8 Regardless, shining light on
the misconduct increases transparency and carries the possibility of
influencing prosecutors' behavior and validating harms others
shouldered because of the prosecutors' misconduct.149
The public defender's office or other criminal justice
organizations could also implement a version of this reform. There are
no formal constraints prohibiting these organizations from identifying
the stakeholders from a trial corrupted by misconduct and sending
them a concise summary of the court's finding of Brady misconduct.
Such a letter would not carry the authority or independence of the court
and thus may be discounted by the recipient. But it could nonetheless
provide transparency and other therapeutic benefits that result from
acknowledging the dignity of the people who unknowingly played a part
in the initial, corrupted conviction. The web site, The Open File:
Prosecutorial Misconduct and Accountability,15 0 is an example of a
private organization that publishes a version of a Brady Violation
Disclosure Letter. The site does not directly distribute disclosure letters
to interested stakeholders, but it does publish concise and jargon-free
summaries of cases involving prosecutorial misconduct. 16 1 The site's
125, 137-41 (2008) (describing how "the meaningful screening of cases now may be prosecutorial
instead of judicial").
146. See supra note 108.
147. See Stroud, supra note 62:
I apologize to Glenn Ford for all the misery I have caused him and his family. I apologize
to the family of Mr. Rozeman for giving them the false hope of some closure. I apologize
to the members of the jury for not having all of the story that should have been disclosed
to them.
148. Cf. R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us About
a Prosecutor'sEthical Duty to 'Seek Justice,'82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635, 672 (2006) ("[A] prudent
and courageous prosecutor understands that sometimes the decision not to cross-examine a
witness is a sign of integrity and strength rather than weakness.").
149. See infra Section III.B. (discussing the potential benefits of Brady Violation Disclosure
Letters).
150. OPEN FILE: PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT & ACCOUNTABILITY,

http://www.prosecutorialaccountability.com (last visited Sept. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/T9JTUKQJJ.
151. See, e.g., Bert, TX CCA Agrees Avalanche of Brady-Giglio Violations Overwhelmed Two
Convictions, OPEN FILE: PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AND ACCOUNTABILITY (Jan. 16, 2018),

http://www.prosecutorialaccountability.com/2018/01/16/tx-cca-agrees-avalanche-of-brady-giglioviolations-overwhelmed-two-convictions/
[https://perma.cclG4WX-NYPB]
(summarizing the
prosecutorial misconduct that resulted in the court vacating Dennis Lee Allen's and Stanley
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reach and coverage is spotty, however, and its collection of misconduct
summaries has not gained the same acceptance as other data sets
compiled by private criminal justice reform organizations. 1 5 2
Furthermore, when compared to a Brady Violation Disclosure Letter
distributed by a court, some people will be skeptical of The Open File's
summaries because it is an advocacy organization. 153
In addition to judges, prosecutors, or other criminal justice
organizations implementing Brady Violation Disclosure Letters on
their own in an ad hoc manner, these disclosure letters could become
routine with a tweak to criminal procedure rules. Many jurisdictions
have established victims' rights provisions by statute or state
constitutional protections and these provisions are often codified in the
rules of criminal procedure. 154 These rights are generally designed to
promote the fair treatment of victims and respect for victims' dignity. 155
The rights often include robust notice requirements to keep victims
apprised of case developments. 15 6 These notice requirements could be
amended to also require notice of Brady misconduct to all relevant
stakeholders.1 5 7 Admittedly, amending the rules of criminal procedure
Mozee's murder convictions); Bert, TX: DOJArguesfor NarrowInterpretationof Brady Obligations
in 5th Circuit; Several Organizations Take the Other Side, OPEN FILE: PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT AND ACCOUNTABILITY (Feb. 5, 2018), http://www.prosecutorialaccountability.com/
2018/02/05/tx-doj-argues-for-narrow-interpretation-of-brady-obligations-in-5th-circuit-severalorganizations-take-the-other-side/ [https://perma.cc/9NCK-Q9F5] (discussing the status of George
Alvarez's appeal regarding the applicability of Brady to the plea-bargaining process).
152. See, e.g., Featured Cases, INNOCENCE PROJECT (last visited Sept. 1, 2018),
(listing cases of
[https://perma.cclRN2C-8CQK]
https://www.innocenceproject.org/all-cases/
wrongfully convicted individuals later exonerated by DNA evidence); Browse Cases, NAT'L
REGISTRY EXONERATIONS (last visited Sept. 2, 2018), https://www.law.umich.edulspeciall
exoneration/Pages/browse.aspx# [https://perma.cc/7AF9-MT6C] (listing cases of wrongfully
convicted individuals later exonerated).
153. About Us, OPEN FILE: PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AND ACCOUNTABILITY (last visited

Sept. 8, 2018), http://www.prosecutorialaccountability.com/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/9LUUHZ4T] ("We believe that too often, prosecutors-whose job it is to enforce the law-violate the laws
and Constitution of the United States as well as the ethical rules of the legal profession. And too
often this misconduct goes unaddressed.").
154. See Paul G. Cassell, Crime Victims' Rights, in 3 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra
note 47, at 227, 229-31 (describing the evolution of the victims' rights movement); id. at 230 ("To
date, about 35 states have adopted victims' rights amendments to their own state constitutions
protecting a wide range of victims' rights."); see, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 39 ("Victims' Rights").
155. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 39(b)(1) (referring to the "right to be treated with fairness,
respect and dignity").
156. See Cassell, supra note 154, at 232-33 (identifying notice provisions as one of the core
protections provided by victims' rights regimes); see, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 39(g) ("Court
Enforcement of Victim Notice Requirements").
157. There may be a slight tension between existing victims' rights regimes and Brady
Violation Disclosure Letters. Generally, these rights presume the reliability of the prosecutor's
charges and a conviction and designate the prosecutor as the entity to protect victims' interests.
See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 39(b)(1 1)-(12) (outlining protections where defense requests information
from victims); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 39(d)(1) ("A victim has the right to the prosecutor's assistance in
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adds to the implementation costs of this proposal. However, given the
overlap with the goals of existing victims' rights protections, amending
the rules may not be a significant barrier.
Publicly disclosing prosecutorial misconduct with a Brady
Violation Disclosure Letter is no panacea. I do not offer it as a
comprehensive remedy for Brady misconduct. Rather, given the
limitations of the current remedies, it should be added to the mix
because of the ease with which it can be implemented and the potential
benefits it offers. The next Section examines these benefits and
implementation issues.
B. The Case for Publicly Disclosing Brady Misconduct
Developing a system that guarantees complete compliance with
Brady is unlikely. 15 8 Even the most robust open-file discovery regime
combined with prosecutors and law enforcement officers committed to
Brady's ideals would still result in some violations. 15 9 This is true for a
number of reasons: law enforcement disciplinary records, a prime
source of Brady material, may remain shielded from disclosure by state
laws; 16 0 exculpatory information may not be memorialized because even
well-meaning police officers or prosecutors could fail to recognize how a
skilled defense attorney could use the information; 16 1 or prosecutors
asserting rights enumerated in this rule or otherwise provided by law."). Nevertheless, amending
victims' rights provisions to require that victims receive notice when a conviction or sentence is
vacated because of prosecutors' Brady misconduct is consistent with current victims' rights
provisions. See Cassell, supra note 154, at 242 (identifying "the right to notice of release or escape
of the accused" as a core victims' right).
158. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 73 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Brady mistakes
are inevitable."); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976) (recognizing that the pretrial
materiality determination is guided by an "inevitably imprecise standard" and that "the
significance of an item of evidence can seldom be predicted accurately until the entire record is
complete").
159. See Grunwald, supra note 47, at 807:
As an example, from the perspective of police officers, the arrest report is "primarily an
'internal memorandum' serving the perceived needs of the police department." Its
"primary function for the police is 'to justify the arrest and clear the case,' [which] can
be achieved by confining reports to what is necessary to satisfy the probable cause
standard, ignoring exculpatory evidence." There is also evidence that officers often fail
to collect, record, or transfer exculpatory evidence to the prosecution.
(footnotes omitted).
160. See Jonathan Abel, Brady's Blind Spot: Impeachment Evidence in Police PersonnelFiles
and the Battle Splitting the Prosecution Team, 67 STAN. L. REV. 743, 745 (2015) ("[T]here is a
critical source of Brady material that even well-meaning prosecutors are often unable to discover
or disclose: evidence of police misconduct contained in police personnel files."); id. at 747 ("[C]ritical
impeachment evidence is routinely and systematically suppressed as a result of state laws and
local policies that limit access to the [law enforcement] personnel files.").
161. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 698 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Evidence
that is of doubtful worth in the eyes of the prosecutor could be of inestimable value to the defense,
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may never actually learn of exculpatory information. 162 Furthermore,
even when prosecutors recognize information as potential Brady
evidence, their disclosure decision is often the result of a complex
calculation. 163 Recognizing the persistence of Brady violations should
not be an invitation to maintain the status quo. Rather, we should
pursue reforms that offer theoretical promise, particularly if they carry
little risk. Official public disclosure of Brady violations to targeted
populations meets these conditions for several reasons.
1. Increasing Brady Compliance
Although in tension with the conventional wisdom that
prosecutors are insulated from public opinion, 164 Brady Violation
Disclosure Letters would likely capture prosecutors' attention because
of their potential to alter the public's view of prosecutors, leading to
increased compliance with Brady obligations. Conventional wisdom
dictates that prosecutors' insulated existence preserves their power
because of the informational advantages that arise in a system in which
165
the vast majority of prosecutorial discretion is exercised privately.
Prosecutors exploiting the informational advantages benefit from a

and might make the difference to the trier of fact."); cf. Report to Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan, supra
note 102 (finding that one of the causes of the prosecutorial misconduct in Senator Stevens's case
was the failure to ensure that "significant exculpatory information" in prosecutors' and law
enforcements' "handwritten notes" were transcribed and included in official reports).
162. See Bibas, Brady, supra note 64, at 142 ("Courts have charged prosecutors with the
knowledge that is in their offices and their investigative agencies, but not other jurisdictions' files.
As a practical matter, however, prosecutors will never learn of much of this material, and it will
never come to light." (footnote omitted)); Yaroshefsky & Green, supra note 116, at 280
("Prosecutors often note the difficulty of complying with their Brady obligations because of the
police agency's failure to disclose information to them.").
163. Yaroshefsky & Green, supra note 116, at 270:
[W]hen it comes to pretrial disclosure, the principal influences on prosectors' decision
making are likely to be organizational factors. Whether and how junior or "line"
prosecutors comply with rules and law, and especially whether they exercise discretion
wisely and fairly, is likely to be determined by the complex interplay of internal and
personal considerations such as office culture and policy, office regulatory and
supervisory practices, and prosecutors' own professional values.
164. See Ronald F. Wright, How ProsecutorElections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 583
(2009) ("[P]rosecutor elections ... do not often force an incumbent to give any public explanation
at all for the priorities and practices of the office."). But see Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 728
(1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Under our system of government, the primary check against
prosecutorial abuse is a political one.").
165. See Stephanos Bibas, Transparencyand Participationin Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 911, 918 (2006) [hereinafter Bibas, Transparency] ("Insiders will always have more
information, more power, and more practical concerns than outsiders, and the media and
politicians will always exploit this gap . . . .").
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feedback loop that is propelled by media coverage of high-profile crimes,
consolidating even more power in prosecutors' offices. 1 66
Despite conventional wisdom, prosecutors are not immune from
public influence, particularly where negative publicity stems from
misconduct that cuts to the core of the prosecutorial function, as Brady
violations do. 167 Shedding light on misconduct in a targeted fashion
offers promise to influence prosecutors to employ robust disclosure
practices, thus heeding the Supreme Court's repeated advice to
interpret Brady expansively. 16 8 The available empirical data, case
studies, and theoretical studies support the conclusion that Brady
Violation Disclosure Letters have the potential to increase Brady
compliance.
Recent empirical work by two of the leading experts on
prosecutorial decisionmaking and the constitutional and ethical rules
that regulate prosecutors suggests that targeted public disclosure of
Brady violations may have promising results. 169 Professors Ellen
Yaroshefsky and Bruce Green interviewed prosecutors to determine the
"environmental and organizational influences that shape individual
prosecutors' decisions about the pretrial release of information to the
defense."1 7 0 Ultimately, they concluded that disclosure decisions are
likely not influenced by public opinion, 171 but they conditioned this
conclusion on the presumption that the public lacks information about
prosecutors' disclosure practices and would likely not learn of
prosecutors' compliance with disclosure laws. 1 7 2 Notably, Professors

166. See id. at 946:
The moral of the story is that outsiders cannot win enduring victories. Outsiders lack
the knowledge, the power, and the enduring desire to keep monitoring low-visibility
procedural decisions. Politicians and the media play entrepreneurial roles, periodically
seizing on gripping (and sometimes unrepresentative) anecdotes to excite popular
outrage and pressure for their own ends. Politicians simultaneously cater to insider
prosecutors, playing both sides of the insider-outsider gulf. This dynamic is a
spiral . . . [Tihe spiral warps the system, taking a serious toll on criminal justice.
(footnote omitted).
167. See Wright, supranote 164, at 590-91 (exploring reasons to be optimistic that prosecutors
may respond to public opinion).
168. See Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 470 n.15 (2009) ("As we have often observed, the prudent
prosecutor will err on the side of transparency, resolving doubtful questions in favor of
disclosure."); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995) ("[A] prosecutor anxious about tacking too
close to the wind will disclose a favorable piece of evidence."); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,
108 (1976) ("[T]he prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure.").
169. Yaroshefsky & Green, supranote 116.
170. Id. at 270.
171. See id. at 275 ("Public opinion is unlikely to have a major impact on disclosure policies of
a prosecutor's office and certainly not on the conduct of junior or line prosecutors.").
172. See id. ("The public is often only dimly aware of what prosecutors do. Policies and
practices regarding pretrial disclosure are unlikely to come to the public's attention .... ).
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Yaroshefsky and Green conceded that in high-profile cases prosecutors'
disclosure practices could become part of the public debate, causing
prosecutors to take notice. 173 Sparking the public's attention is precisely
one of the goals of Brady Violation Disclosure Letters.
Two chief prosecutors interviewed in the study confirmed
prosecutors' sensitivity to preserving the high level of trust the public
gives them. 17 4 They explained:
If we don't do our jobs in a manner that is ethically appropriate, then the longer term
consequence is that people don't trust you. If they don't trust you, then they won't tell you
If an office gets a
the things that you need to know in order to keep them safe. ...
17 5
reputation for cutting corners, it ultimately affects the perception of juries.

Senior prosecutors' views shape the disclosure practices of line
prosecutors. 176 Thus, if chief prosecutors are concerned about potential
negative attention resulting from Brady misconduct, they have the
ability to change the culture and practices in their offices.
In addition to responding to general public perceptions,
prosecutors are particularly responsive to feedback from certain
individuals. For example, judges have an outsized influence on
prosecutors' disclosure practices.1 7 7 Perhaps equally important is the
influence victims and victims' rights organizations can have on
prosecutorial practices.1 7 8 Victims coming forward or being asked to

share how they were harmed by Brady misconduct, as is likely to
happen if they receive a Brady Violation Disclosure Letter, would
certainly attract publicity and the attention of prosecutors.
Several case studies also demonstrate that targeted publication
of prosecutors' Brady violations can influence prosecutorial behavior.
Judge Sullivan's pointed public reprimand of the prosecutors during a
hearing in Senator Stevens's case amounted to a version of a Brady

173. See id. (recognizing that in "high-profile cases" prosecutors' "disclosure decisions [may]
become a matter of public controversy").
174. See id. at 276 ("If chief prosecutors worry that line prosecutors' public failures to comply
with the disclosure law will lead to public embarrassment, they may adopt open file policies or
encourage line prosecutors to err on the side of disclosure.").
175. Id.
176. See id. at 279 (concluding that "office policies adopted or endorsed by the chief prosecutor
or supervisory prosecutors are a significant factor in shaping prosecutors' disclosure practices").
177. See id. at 278 ("Local judges appear to influence prosecutors' disclosure practices, most
commonly through informal expressions of concern or disapproval . . . .").
178. See, e.g., Bibas, Transparency, supranote 165, at 963 (recognizing the power of victims to
influence prosecutors); id.:
The most potent disciplining force is likely to be victims. Victims, and to a lesser extent
affected locals, are a discrete, identifiable group who already know about the crimes
they have endured and are motivated to take part. Because of their background
knowledge, they do not need to be brought up to speed, can speak with authority, and
will not automatically defer to insiders' assessments.
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Violation Disclosure Letter.1 79 While his words were directed at the
career prosecutors handling the case, he was concerned about the
integrity of the criminal justice system, and he no doubt realized that
there was a larger audience beyond those in the courtroom. And he was
right; his words caught the attention of the most senior prosecutors at
the DOJ, ultimately leading to a public statement from Attorney
General Holder. 180 In the aftermath, the DOJ initiated several reforms
designed to increase compliance with prosecutors' disclosure
obligations. Admittedly, the DOJ opposed other reforms; 18 1 however, by
publicly acknowledging the misconduct at the highest level and
initiating internal reforms, the DOJ's response should promote Brady
compliance.182
Michael Morton's exoneration in Texas is another example of
how publicizing Brady violations can lead to increased compliance with
Brady.183 Morton spent twenty-four years in prison for murder before
DNA testing confirmed his innocence and identified the actual
perpetrator. 184 In the course of proving his innocence, Morton uncovered
extensive prosecutorial misconduct, including Brady violations, that
sealed his fate at trial. 185 His exoneration and the investigation of the
misconduct attracted widespread attention not only in Texas but
nationally as well. 186 The case also attracted the attention of voters and
Texas legislature. The attention led to reforms that increased Brady
compliance. On the local level, the District Attorney, who opposed
Morton's request for postconviction DNA testing and defended the
tactics of his predecessor who prosecuted Morton, lost in the next
election.1 87 Morton's exoneration had an equally profound influence on
disclosure practices across Texas. Ultimately, the case resulted in a new

179. See Jones, supra note 44, at 418-21 (describing Judge Sullivan's response to the Brady
misconduct).
180. See Holder, supranote 108.
181. See Sullivan, supra note 101, at 141-46 (describing DOJ opposition to discovery reforms).
182. See Yaroshefsky & Green, supra note 116, at 282 ("Strong, effective leadership shapes
and drives an office's culture. The chief prosecutor sets the tone.").
183. The author was a part of Morton's defense team and the Innocence Project. For an
overview of his case, see MICHAEL MORTON, GETTING LIFE: AN INNOCENT MAN'S 25-YEAR JOURNEY

FROM PRISON TO PEACE (2014). See also Kreag, supra note 55, at 346-49.
184. Michael Morton, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/michaelmorton/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2018) [https://perma.cclCF7W-XY4Y].
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., 60 Minutes: Evidence of Innocence: The Case of Michael Morton (CBS television
broadcast June 23, 2013).
187. See Pamela Colloff, Why John Bradley Lost, TEX. MONTHLY (Jan. 21, 2013),
https://www.texasmonthly.com/politics/why-john-bradley-ost/
[https://perma.cclXL5Y-7LBC]
(characterizing the race as a "referendum on [the District Attorney's] handling of the Michael
Morton case").
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law named in Morton's honor that overhauled Texas's disclosure laws,
creating a version of open-file discovery.188
Admittedly, the response to Morton's and Senator Stevens's
cases may be extreme. The deep attention given to the prosecutorial
misconduct in these cases might have been due to Senator Stevens's
status or to the public's empathy for Morton after he established his
innocence. It would be foolish to conclude that targeted public
disclosure of Brady misconduct will always end in extensive reforms.
Yet, even increasing Brady compliance at the margins is important,
particularly if it is the result of easily implementable reforms. 189
In addition to the empirical data and these case studies, there is
another reason to expect that Brady Violation Disclosure Letters may
influence prosecutorial behavior: shame. In short, the very nature of the
public disclosure may serve to shame some prosecutors into altering
their behavior. Professor Lara Bazelon recently explored shaming as a
means of influencing prosecutors in a related context. 190 While her work
focused on a particular type of shaming performed by judges during oral
argument, 191 the theoretical foundation for her conclusions are relevant
here. Professor Bazelon concluded that prosecutors are likely receptive
to shaming. 192 This is in part because prosecutors' reputations for
pursuing justice are necessary for success, prosecutors often appear
before the same judges and defense attorneys, and prosecutors
generally have the resources and confidence not to be so debilitated
from the shaming that they are unable to reform their behavior. 193

188. Michael Morton Act, ch. 49, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 106 (codified as amended at TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 39.14 (West 2017)) (instituting open file discovery in Texas); see also Robert
P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The
CriticalImportanceofFull Open-FileDiscovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257, 260 (2008) (describing
how three instances of prosecutorial misconduct in North Carolina provided motivation for
adopting a "statute that entitles the defense to relatively full access to both prosecution and law
enforcement files").
189. See infra Section III.B.4.
190. Lara Bazelon, For Shame: The Public Humiliation of Prosecutors by Judges to Correct
Wrongful Convictions, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 305 (2016) (exploring judicial shaming of
prosecutors during oral argument); see also Gershowitz, supra note 144, at 1063-66 (advocating
for publicly naming prosecutors who engage in misconduct).
191. Bazelon, supra note 190, at 318 ("This Article is concerned with a specific type of judicial
shaming. It occurs when the court takes the prosecutor to task during an oral argument for
defending grave misconduct that led to a wrongful conviction.").
192. Id. at 313 ("[Plrosecutors do appear to be excellent shaming candidates: high-achieving
professionals who work in an insular world of repeat players for whom reputation is the central
currency.").

193. Id. at 314 ("Practitioners of shame sanctions aim for a sweet spot: sticks that inflict a
non-lethal harm, wielded against people who are susceptible to humiliation, resilient enough to
recover from it, and possessed of the wherewithal to change their bad behavior so as not to
experience the shaming again."); id. ("Shaming sanctions work because the shamed offenders pride
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These characteristics of the public prosecutor render inapplicable many
of the sound criticisms of shaming as a criminal punishment.194
Finally, Brady Violation Disclosure Letters may lead to
increased Brady compliance because they overcome some of the tricky
timing issues that are inherent to Brady compliance. 195 Scholars argue
that individual prosecutors may feel empowered to commit Brady
violations-or, at a minimum, may not be sufficiently deterred from
committing violations-because they understand that the undisclosed
information will likely remain hidden.196 Furthermore, these
prosecutors conclude that even if the undisclosed evidence is uncovered,
they will likely escape punishment. 197 In this situation, the possibility
of a potential negative consequence that occurs in the future may not
seem sufficiently consequential to influence prosecutors' behavior.
For an individual prosecutor this calculation may make sense.
However, from the public's perspective, prosecutorial offices speak with
one voice, and the public's perception of this voice may not be
sufficiently nuanced to distinguish among individual prosecutors or
across time. Thus, misconduct by. current or past prosecutors risks
being imputed to the office as a whole. That is, even if the public
disclosure of a Brady violation comes years after the individual
prosecutor committed the misconduct, the disclosure may influence

themselves

upon a reputation they have built within

a tight-knit

and norm-observing

community.").

194. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What's Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions, 84 TEX. L. REV.
2075 (2006) (arguing against using shaming punishments); Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and
American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880 (1991) (same).
195. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 701 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing
Brady's materiality prong because it requires "the prosecutor to predict what effect various pieces
of evidence will have on the trial"); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976) (recognizing
that the pretrial materiality determination is "inevitably imprecise" in part because "the
significance of an item of evidence can seldom be predicted accurately until the entire record is
complete"); In re Kline, 113 A.3d 202, 208 (D.C. 2015) ("Retrospective analysis [using the
materiality standard], while it necessarily comports with appellate review, is wholly inapplicable
in pretrial prospective determinations."); see also United States v. Safavian, 233 F.R.D. 12, 16
(D.D.C. 2005) ("Most prosecutors are neither neutral (nor should they be) nor prescient, and any
such judgment [on materiality] necessarily is speculative on so many matters that simply are
unknown and unknowable before trial begins .... ).
196. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 84, at 280-81 ("Because prosecutors know that even if their
behavior is discovered and challenged, courts will most likely find the behavior to be 'harmless
error,' they may be emboldened (consciously or unconsciously) to engage in misconduct."); Jones,
supra note 44, at 433 ("Other than the unenforceable 'honor code,' there are few incentives for
prosecutors to comply with Brady because there is no meaningful judicial oversight of the
process.").

197. See Bibas, Brady, supra note 64, at 141-42 (recognizing that "prosecutors do not fear
being penalized for violating Brady or interpreting it very narrowly" in part because of the
likelihood that courts will find nondisclosure harmless); Jones, supra note 44, at 434 ("[T]he Brady
disclosure duty has become one of the most unenforced constitutional mandates in the criminal
justice system.").
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current prosecutors by motivating those prosecutors and their
supervisors to take action to differentiate themselves from the regime
responsible for the misconduct.
2. Validating Interests Beyond Defendants
Scholars often evaluate responses to Brady violations by
focusing solely on the defendant and the prosecutor responsible for the
misconduct. 198 The usual question with respect to the prosecutor is
whether the response to the misconduct will punish the prosecutor as a
bad actor or treat the underlying cause of his misconduct.199 This focus
usually ends with scholars discussing which is the better approach,
punishment or treatment. 200 With respect to the defendant, the usual
question is whether vacating the conviction or barring retrial is
sufficient to respond to the harm suffered by the defendant. It is not
surprising that the focus on prosecutors and defendants takes center
stage after Brady violations. 201 After all, the prosecutor is the person
who violated the Constitution, 2 02 and the defendant is the person who
suffered the most acute harm.
But Brady protects interests beyond those of the defendant.
Brady works to promote confidence in the fairness of the criminal
justice system as a whole. 203 The Brady doctrine also validates the trial
as the best method to settle charges and disputes. 204 In so doing, Brady
198. See, e.g., Thea Johnson, What You Should Have Known Can Hurt You: Knowledge, Access,
and Brady in the Balance, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 4 (2015) ("At the heart of the Brady doctrine
is a debate about how to balance the role of the defendant, the prosecutor and the court in an
adversarial system."); id. at 5 (concluding that Brady "weighs the integrity of the system against
a desire to be fair to the defendant").
199. See, e.g., McMunigal, supra note 90, at 713-14 (explaining punishment versus treatment
perspectives); see id. at 721 ("The status quo regarding prosecutorial disclosure violations is
unsatisfactory from both a punishment perspective and a treatment perspective.").
200. See id.; Alafair S. Burke, Talking About Prosecutors, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2119, 2121
(2010) ("Fault-based discourse is especially misplaced in the discussion of the disclosure of
evidence to the defense .... ); John F. Hollway, A Systems Approach to Error Reduction in
Criminal

Justice,

QUATRONE

CTR.

FOR

FAIR

ADMIN..

JUST.

20

(Feb.

2014),

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edulcgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1975&context=faculty-scholarship
[https://perma.cc/Q3KP-85GQ] (describing the importance of moving away from a "culture of
individual blame" when investigating wrongful convictions).
201. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985) ("[The Brady rule's] purpose
is ... to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not occur.").
202. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 421 (1995) ("We hold that the prosecutor remains
responsible for gauging [materiality] regardless of any failure by the police to bring favorable
evidence to the prosecutor's attention.").
203. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("Society wins not only when the guilty are
convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when
any accused is treated unfairly.").
204. See id. at 439-40 ("And it will tend to preserve the criminal trial, as distinct from the
prosecutor's private deliberations, as the chosen forum for ascertaining the truth about criminal
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emphasizes the essential role jurors play as the final arbiters of
criminal conduct and serves victims by promoting reliable results.
Given Brady's multiple purposes, responses to Brady violations should
at least attempt to respond to the multifaceted harms associated with
the misconduct rather than focusing only on the prosecutor and
defendant.
In other work, I have explored how Brady violations harm
jurors. 2 0 5 Specifically, they block the jury's role in the adjudicative
process, undermine the dignity and legitimacy of jurors, and risk
turning jurors into unknowing pawns in the misconduct. 206
Importantly, these harms happen in the context of a criminal justice
system that has shifted power away from jurors. 207
One of the motivations for disclosing Brady misconduct to jurors
is to rebalance relative power in the adjudicative process, returning at
least a small amount of power to the jury. In this manner, Brady
Violation Disclosure Letters serve similar ends to other reform
proposals that have sought to return power to jurors in a modern system
that too regularly processes criminal convictions through private
negotiations between prosecutors and defendants. 208
Victims are also harmed by Brady violations, and this harm
should at least be recognized by informing victims of the misconduct.
Some of the harms to victims from Brady misconduct are obvious. For
example, a finding of misconduct at a minimum may require a retrial,
at which time the victim risks being retraumatized. If the magnitude of
the Brady violation was severe, the prosecution may elect to dismiss the
case without a retrial. This may leave the victim with the stress of
adjusting to a new reality, upending what she thought was a final
determination. There is also the possibility that if the Brady violation
culminated with a finding that the person convicted of the crime was
actually innocent, the victim will experience extreme guilt for being a
part of a process that ended with an innocent person in prison. 209 Other
accusations."); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 506 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(characterizing the trial as the "main event in which the issue of guilt or innocence can be fairly
resolved" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
205. See Kreag, supranote 55, at 350-51 (proposing the recognition of a separate Brady-like
constitutional right in the jury).
206. See id. at 362-74.
207. See Bibas, Transparency, supra note 165, at 951 ("Now that juries are an endangered
species, however, criminal justice is more opaque and dominated by insiders.").
208. See, e.g., SUJA A. THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN JURY 158-63 (2016) (advocating for
increased use of grand juries to initiate criminal prosecutions); Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal
Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2173, 2180-81 (2014) (summarizing
proposals for specialty juries to increase "civilian input" in the system).
209. Cf. Jennifer Thompson, 'I Was Certain, but I Was Wrong,' N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2000),
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/06/18/opinion/i-was-certain-but-i-was-wrong.html
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harms may be less obvious. For example, a victim may feel like she no
longer has an advocate in the system. 2 10 Of course, prosecutors
represent the state, not victims, in criminal prosecutions; 211 however, it
is likely that victims come to believe that the prosecutor is their
champion, perhaps even their protector. Yet, when the victim learns of
the prosecutor's misconduct, the victim may experience a void, perhaps
questioning who if anyone had her interests at heart during the initial,
tainted proceedings. 2 12
To be certain, the harms victims endure as a result of
prosecutorial misconduct will vary significantly given the nature of the
crime, the victim's characteristics and resources, and the nature of the
misconduct. Furthermore, simply disclosing to victims a notice
documenting the Brady misconduct may offer only a very partial
remedy. But such a statement could prove powerful for some victims
because it at least validates the victim as someone also hurt by the
misconduct. 213
The harms caused to witnesses from a trial infected by Brady
misconduct should also be acknowledged. It is not uncommon in cases
overturned because of Brady violations to examine trial records only to
find that prosecutors did more than fail to disclose exculpatory
evidence. Rather, prosecutors often exacerbate the constitutional
violation with arguments that would have been easily rebutted by the
undisclosed evidence. 214 Such actions often result in unjustified attacks

[https://perma.cc/MB8Z-LWKH] (describing her "anguish" for contributing to a wrongful conviction
by identifying the wrong perpetrator).
210. See Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 611,
621-23 (2009) (describing the therapeutic benefits to victims that come with participation in the
process).
211. See AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 76, at 1 ("[The prosecutor's] client is the public, not victims
and not the police.").
212. Ironically, prosecutors have pointed to victims' interests to oppose more robust disclosure
obligations to defendants. The Department of Justice opposed reform legislation following Senator
Stevens's case, arguing that the existing disclosure rules effectively "balance . . . a defendant's
constitutional rights [while] ... safeguarding the equally important public interests in a criminal
trial process that reaches timely and just results, safeguards victims and witnesses from
retaliation or intimidation, [and] does not unnecessarily intrude on victims' and witnesses'
personal privacy. . . ." Statement for the Record, supra note 113, at 5; see Fairness in Disclosure
of Evidence Act of 2012, S. 2197, 112th Cong. (2012) (proposing to require prosecutors to disclose
favorable information to criminal defendants); see also Sonja N.Y. Kawasaki, Comment, Uncle Ted
Teaches a Lesson: The Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act Challenges a Flawed Exculpatory
Evidence Disclosure System, 39 U. DAYTON L. REV. 413 (2015) (analyzing the proposed Fairness in
Disclosure of Evidence Act).
213. See Cassell, supranote 154, at 229 (describing the victims' rights movement as a response
to a criminal justice system that seemed to have overlooked victims' interests).
214. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 168 A.3d 97, 98 (Pa. 2017) (Donohue, J., writing in
support of affirmance) (describing Williams's prosecutor taking advantage of the concealed
evidence during closing argument).
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on the credibility of defense witnesses. For example, prosecutors may
directly attack the credibility of defense witnesses despite suppressing
evidence that would have supported the witnesses' credibility.
Relatedly, they may indirectly attack the credibility of defense
witnesses by arguing that prosecution witnesses were more reliable
despite undisclosed evidence that would have impeached the
prosecution witnesses.
Even prosecution witnesses may be harmed by prosecutors'
Brady misconduct. A witness who is initially reluctant to cooperate at
trial-perhaps because of potential doubts about the reliability of the
prosecution's case-may be moved by an appeal from the prosecutor
about the importance of the witness's testimony and the prosecution's
confidence in the accuracy of his case. Yet when the case unravels
because of the prosecution's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence,
that same witness may feel used by the prosecutor. She may experience
guilt about becoming an unwitting assistant in the prosecutor's
misdeeds. Sending a notice to witnesses about the prosecutor's
misconduct may not be a complete remedy for these witnesses.
However, official disclosure of misconduct at least validates witnesses
as persons impacted by the misconduct.
Given the harm jurors, victims, and witnesses face from Brady
violations, notifying these individuals of the misconduct as a partial
remedy is justified in its own right even if nothing else comes of the
notification. But there is reason to expect that this remedy may produce
important salutary outcomes as well. The encounter with official
misconduct may turn some of these individuals into advocates. 215 At a
minimum, the media may ask them to comment on the misconduct. This
attention alone could serve as a reminder of the wide range of harms
caused by convictions
obtained through Brady misconduct.
Furthermore, prosecutors will likely take note of these comments, as
jurors, victims, and witnesses will command attention from the
public. 2 16

215. See Kreag, supra note 55, at 371-73 (describing a juror reacting to the prosecutorial
misconduct by becoming an advocate for the defendant).
216. See Bibas, supra note 165, at 963:
The most potent disciplining force is likely to be victims. Victims, and to a lesser extent
affected locals, are a discrete identifiable group who already know about the crimes they
have endured and are motivated to take part. Because of their background knowledge,
they do not need to be brought up to speed, can speak with authority, and will not
automatically defer to insiders' assessments.
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3. Promoting Transparency
The result of every Brady violation, intentional or otherwise, is
that relevant probative evidence remains hidden, unexamined by the
adjudicative process. 217 The secretive nature inherent in the misconduct
2 18
is compounded because the misconduct itself often goes unnoticed.
Investigating Brady compliance is even more difficult because
prosecutors are reluctant to share their internal guidelines. 219 As such,
Brady misconduct contributes to our modern system of adjudication
that is opaque to all but a few active participants. 2 2 0 One of the benefits
of Brady Violation Disclosure Letters is that they partially counter the
lack of transparency in the system, giving the public important
information about how prosecutors exercise their power. 221
Many factors have contributed to the current lack of
transparency that often leaves prosecutorial decisions insulated from
external regulation. 222 Courts are reluctant to invade prosecutors'
charging practices. 223 Lawmakers have expanded substantive criminal
217. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 106 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("A Brady
violation, by its nature, causes suppression of evidence beyond the defendant's capacity to ferret
out.").

218. See McMunigal, supra note 90, at 713 ("For a variety of reasons, including the nature of
disclosure violations, the infrequency of imposition of disciplinary sanctions, and the prevalence of
negotiated guilty pleas, prosecutorial disclosure violations remain largely hidden from view.").
219. See Yaroshefsky & Green, supra note 116, at 279 ("The few offices with written disclosure
policies do not make them public and would not provide them to us."); Mike Scarcella, Part of
DOJ's Criminal Discovery 'Blue Book' Unsealed for First Time, NATL L.J. (Jan. 17, 2018, 12:56
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/sites/nationallawjournal/2018/01/17/part-of-dojsPM),
criminal-discovery-blue-book-unsealed-for-first-time/?sreturn=20180512180206
[https://perma.ccl3C4U-LKGY] (discussing the DOJ's resistance to disclosing its criminal
discovery guide).
220. See Stephanos Bibas, ProsecutorialRegulation Versus ProsecutorialAccountability, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 959, 983 (2009) ("[T]he public suffers from chronic misperceptions about how the
criminal justice system actually works."); Bibas, supra note 165, at 923 ("Much of the criminal
justice system is hidden from [the public's] view.").
221. See Bibas, supra note 220, at 960 ("No government official in America has as much
unreviewable power and discretion as the prosecutor."); Attorney General Robert H. Jackson, The
Federal Prosecutor, 31 AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 3 (1940) ("The prosecutor has more
control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in America.").
222. See Ronald F. Wright, ProsecutorInstitutions and Incentives, in 3 REFORMING CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, supra note 47, at 49, 50 ("Compared to many other government officials, prosecutors
operate within a legal framework that leaves them free to choose office priorities that they-and
they alone-believe are appropriate."); Jason Kreag, ProsecutorialAnalytics, 94 WASH. U. L. REV.
771, 796-98 (2017) (examining the limited external oversight and regulation of prosecutorial
decisionmaking).
223. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) ("[T]he decision to prosecute is
particularly ill-suited to judicial review."). Even when reviewing alleged race-based charging
practices, the Supreme Court has adopted a standard providing prosecutors wide discretion.
Compare Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (recognizing the prohibition of charging
decisions "deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other
arbitrary classification"), with McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311 (1987) ("McCleskey's
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prohibitions, leaving prosecutors with greater discretion in deciding
who to prosecute and what charges to bring. 224 Plea bargaining is
ubiquitous and subject to very little oversight. 225 Scholars have
responded to the lack of transparency by proposing a variety of reforms
to increase the public's ability to understand and engage with the
criminal justice system. 2 2 6 Brady Violation Disclosure Letters serve this
purpose.
Advocating for increased transparency of the prosecutorial
function is far from a radical request. The power prosecutors hold and
their status as representatives of the people provide sufficient
independent justification for greater transparency even if prosecutors'
actions do not involve misconduct. 22 7 Where misconduct is involved,

argument that the Constitution condemns the discretion allowed decisionmakers in the Georgia
capital sentencing system is antithetical to the fundamental role of discretion in our criminal
justice system.").
224. See Douglas Husak, Overcriminalization, in 1 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
INTRODUCTION AND CRIMINALIZATION 25 (Erik Luna ed., 2017), http://academyforjustice.org/wp-

content/uploads/2017/10/Reforming-Criminal-Justice_Vol_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AT3Z-NRGR]
(exploring the importance of drafting criminal statutes that are sufficiently limited to "impose
liability only on those who are deserving"); William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPoliticsof Criminal
Law, 100 MICH. L. REv. 505, 509 (2001) ("As criminal law expands, both lawmaking and
adjudication pass into the hands of police and prosecutors; law enforcers, not the law, determine
who goes to prison and for how long.").
225. See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012) ("[Clriminal justice today is for the most
part a system of pleas, not a system of trials."); Missouri v. Frye, 556 U.S. 134, 143 (2012) ("Ninetyseven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of
guilty pleas."); SUJA A. THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN JURY 44 (2016) ("Plea bargaining is the
most prominent example of this shift in power from the jury to the [prosecutor]."); Albert W.
Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A BriefHistory of the CriminalJury in the United States, 61 U. CHI.
L. REv. 867, 927 (1994) (concluding that with the decline of jury trials, "prosecutors are [now] the
judges of law and fact.").
226. See, e.g., John E. Pfaff, ProsecutorialGuidelines, in 3 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
supra note 47, at 101, 103 (proposing that states "adopt charging and plea-bargaining guidelines
that are legally binding on county prosecutors"); Wright, supra note 222, at 61-71 (reviewing
reform proposals that are designed to "give prosecutors more information about their communities
and about their own work, and give the public more-specific information about prosecutor
performance"); Laura I. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L.J. 731 (2010) (advocating for
"changing the guilty plea procedure to make it more trial-like in form ... by including the jury");
Kreag, supra note 222, at 792-804 (arguing for increased information collection and analysis to
increase transparency); Michael S. McGinniss, Sending the Message: Using Technology to Support
Judicial Reporting of Lawyer Misconduct to State DisciplinaryAgencies, J. PROF. LAW., 2013, at
37, 37 (proposing "that state and federal court systems create electronic databases . . . to receive
and store judicial reports of litigation-related lawyer misconduct."); Simonson, supra note 208,
2176-77 (promoting "the ability of citizens to participate in democracy and to hold the criminal
justice system accountable" through the concept of public criminal adjudication).
227. See Bibas, Transparency, supra note 165, at 961 ("Greater transparency and public
information, however, is more likely to discipline elected insiders [such as prosecutors]. Even if
they are uncertain how many people are paying attention, insiders may fear that an electoral
opponent will seize on this information, swaying swing voters at the next election.").
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there is an even greater need for transparency to ensure that the public
has the information needed to evaluate its agent. 228
Elsewhere I have argued for collecting, analyzing, and disclosing
data about prosecutors' decisions as a means of increasing
transparency. 229 I still endorse that endeavor. But we should pursue
Brady Violation Disclosure Letters as well. They offer a targeted
response to those most harmed by Brady misconduct. Furthermore,
over time, they could form the bases for their own database of Brady
misconduct cases. 230
4. Adaptability and Flexibility in Implementation
Two additional virtues of Brady Violation Disclosure Letters are
the ease with which they can be implemented and their flexibility,
making them a possible remedy for Brady misconduct regardless of the
size of the jurisdiction. 2 3 1 Some reforms designed, to increase Brady
compliance contain significant implementation hurdles. For example,
many commentators have proposed deleting Brady's materiality
prong. 2 32 Others have proposed new laws or amendments to criminal

procedure or professional conduct rules to expand discovery obligations
beyond what Brady requires. 233 These proposals involve significant
implementation costs. The Supreme Court has demonstrated no
appetite for abandoning Brady's materiality prong. And passing new
laws or rules requires significant resources. By contrast, judges already

228. Cf. Abel, supra note 160, at 789-90 ("[Police o]fficers are public officials serving in
positions of great public trust. Official documentation of their misconduct should be accessible to
the public .... ).
229. See Kreag, supra note 222, at 792-804 (proposing a data-driven analytical framework).
230. Cf. Jason Tashea, DatabasesCreate Access to PoliceMisconduct Cases and Offer a Handy
Tool for Defense Lawyers, A-B.A. J. (Feb. 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
databases create access-to-police-misconduct-cases andofferahandy-tool_f
[https://perma.cc/59RB-CZHK (discussing databases in New York and Chicago that track police
misconduct).
231. See Ronald F. Wright & Kay L Levine, Place Matters in ProsecutionResearch, 14 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 675, 677 (2017) (recognizing the importance of considering how prosecutors' offices
differ when proposing reforms).
232. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 701 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the materiality prong); In re Kline, 113 A.3d 202, 208 (D.C. 2015) (characterizing Brady analysis
as a retrospective evaluation ill-suited for the pretrial context); see also Daniel S. Medwed, Brady's
Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533, 1555-57 (2010) (discussing the advantages of
reforming or eliminating the materiality prong).
233. See, e.g., Michael Morton Act, ch. 49, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 106 (codified as amended at
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14 (West 2017)); Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of
2012, S. 2197, 112th Cong. § 2 (2012) (proposing enhanced disclosure requirements in criminal
prosecutions); Daniel S. McConkie, The Local Rules Revolution in CriminalDiscovery, 39 CARDOZO
L. REV. 59, 78-93 (2017) (discussing the use of local rules to strengthen prosecutorial disclosure
obligations); supra Section II.E (discussing statutes criminalizing prosecutorial misconduct).
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possess the inherent authority to order clerks to send Brady Violation
Disclosure Letters.
Furthermore, Brady Violation Disclosure Letters offer the
flexibility to be used regardless of the size of the jurisdiction. This
cannot be said of some of the other proposals. Not all jurisdictions have
the infrastructure or resources to implement open-file discovery
policies. Similarly, many jurisdictions do not have adequate resources
to use existing attorney disciplinary regimes to police Brady
compliance. 234 Consequently, these jurisdictions would not have
resources to create independent commissions to investigate
prosecutorial misconduct. 235 And it is certainly the rare jurisdiction
with the resources to conduct robust, independent investigations of
prosecutorial misconduct as was done in Senator Stevens's case. 2 3 6
These resource limitations do not constrain Brady Violation Disclosure
Letters. Individual judges can adopt this reform on an ad hoc basis.
5. Providing the Judiciary Another Tool for Policing Brady
To the extent judges are inclined to enforce Brady's protections,
Brady Violation Disclosure Letters represent an additional tool judges
can employ immediately, without waiting for new statutes, new
constitutional interpretations, or changes to criminal procedure rules.
Although the Brady doctrine is largely implemented by prosecutors
with little, if any, input from judges, 237 judges are uniquely situated to
oversee prosecutors' Brady compliance and alter prosecutorial
practices. Many judges have already used their inherent power to
reinforce prosecutors' constitutional disclosure obligations. For
example, following the misconduct in Senator Stevens's prosecution,
Judge Emmet Sullivan began issuing a standing order in every criminal
case clearly identifying and describing prosecutors' Brady
obligations. 238 Other trial courts have followed Judge Sullivan's lead by
234. See Zacharias, supra note 98, at 756 ("Disciplinary authorities have limited resources to
prosecute violations of the professional rules. They must determine how to allocate those resources
so as to punish misconduct most effectively. . . .").
235. See Caldwell, supra note 117, at 1484-85 (considering the costs of implementing a
Prosecutorial Review Panel); cf. Kozinski, supra note 57, at iii, xxxii (calling for independent
prosecutorial oversight agencies).
236. See supra Section II.C (describing the extensive investigation of Senator. Stevens's
prosecutors and their misconduct).
237. See Jones, supra note 44, at 433 ("Other than the unenforceable 'honor code,' there are
few incentives for prosecutors to comply with Brady. because there is no meaningful judicial
oversight of the process.").
238. See Sullivan, supra note 101, at 149 ("Following the Stevens case, I have issued a standing
Brady Order for each criminal case on my docket, updating it in reaction to developments in the
law.").
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adopting local rules that codify Brady.239 Judges can also conduct brief
0
on-the-record colloquies with prosecutors to nudge Brady compliance. 24
And they can employ shaming techniques by writing detailed orders
and opinions that include the names of the prosecutors responsible for
the Brady violations 241 or by using questioning during oral argument to
shine light on prosecutors' misconduct. 242
Judges who have employed these techniques will likely find
Brady Violation Disclosure Letters appealing. But this reform is also
designed to appeal to judges who have not taken steps to increase Brady
compliance. Some of these judges may be moved by the harms victims,
jurors, and witnesses face from prosecutorial misconduct. Brady
Violation Disclosure Letters are not a complete remedy for these harms
but they at least recognize them. This recognition alone may cause some
judges to pay more attention to Brady's protections.
6. Uncovering Patterns of Misconduct
Brady Violation Disclosure Letters carry the added benefit of
potentially uncovering patterns of misconduct. As they are publicized,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, convicted offenders, scholars, and
journalists will no doubt review them and investigate whether the
misconduct was an isolated event. 243 This investigation could lead to the
239. See McConkie, supra note 233, at 111 (explaining that the expansion of local criminal
discovery rules "invigorate[s] Brady enforcement by allowing trial judges to actively manage
discovery throughout the pretrial stage of the case"); Sullivan, supra note 101, at 147
("Approximately twenty-eight of the ninety-four federal district courts nationwide have
promulgated rules regarding the disclosure obligations of prosecutors who appear in those courts,
and eight more districts have issued standing orders governing those obligations." (footnotes
omitted)); Press Release, New York State Unified Court System, Chief Judge DiFiore Announces
Implementation of New Measure Aimed at Enhancing the Delivery of Justice in Criminal Cases
(Nov. 8, 2017) (on file with author) (announcing and discussing the statewide adoption of New
York's standing Brady order).
240. See United States v. Garcia, No. CR 15-4275 JB, 2017 WL 2290963, at *30-32 (D.N.M.
May 2, 2017) (discussing but ultimately electing not to utilize a Brady colloquy); Kozinski, supra
note 57, at xxxiv (endorsing pretrial Brady colloquies); Jason Kreag, The Brady Colloquy, 67 STAN.
L. REV. ONLINE 47, 49 (2014) (same).
241. See Gershowitz, supra note 144, at 1090 ('The obvious approach to shaming misbehaving
prosecutors among their peer group is not to use newspapers that would reach a general audience,
but, instead, judicial opinions that would be read by judges and other lawyers.").
242. See Bazelon, supra note 190, at 328 ("[Alppellate judges [may] use oral arguments as a
forum to express their condemnation of prosecutors who defend misconduct-related
convictions ....

).

243. See Stephanos Bibas et al., New Perspectiveson Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations:
Report of the Working Groups on Best Practices, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 2007-10 (2010)
(discussing the use of audits to regulate compliance with Brady); id. at 2012 (recommending that
"[plrosecutors' offices should adopt prospective auditing mechanisms that provide a mechanism of
routine oversight of disclosure obligations"); cf. Levenson, supra note 31, at 393 ("Experienced
prosecutors understand that an admission in one case can affect the outcomes of other pending
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discovery of additional miscarriages of justice and potentially form the
basis for training tools if patterns emerge. 244
The recent experience of the Brooklyn District Attorney's
Office's handling of several unrelated cases infected by the misconduct
of one police officer is illustrative. Louis Scarcella was once a revered
homicide detective, yet his reputation started to crumble after one of
his murder investigations unraveled in 2013, ending in the exoneration
of David Ranta. 24 5 The prosecution's reinvestigation revealed that
Scarcella fabricated an identification and offered benefits to key
witnesses in exchange for help in the investigation without disclosing
this to the defense. 246 Other convicted offenders and defense attorneys
who suspected that Scarcella committed misconduct in their cases took
note. 2 4 7 Three months later, the Brooklyn District Attorney announced
an independent panel to investigate dozens of Scarcella's
investigations. 248 Ultimately, the reinvestigation that began with
Ranta's exoneration expanded to more than seventy of Scarcella's cases
and led to courts overturning at least ten murder convictions. 249
petitions. Yet, this impact should not influence prosecutors to withhold discovery or admission of
error.").

244. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.3(a) cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015) ("An
apparently isolated violation may indicate a pattern of misconduct that only a disciplinary
investigation can uncover. Reporting a violation is especially important where the victim is
unlikely to discover the offense."); cf. Adam M. Gershowitz, ProsecutorialDismissals as Teachable
Moments (and Databases)for the Police, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1525 (2018) (advocating a formal
process requiring prosecutors to notify police officers if cases are dismissed after arrest).
245. Michael Powell & Sharon Otterman, Jailed Unjustly in the Death of a Rabbi, Man Nears
Freedom, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/20/nyregion/brooklynprosecutor-to-seek-freedom-of-man-convicted-in-1990-killing-of-rabbi.html
[https://perma.cc/
84KC-T3CN].
246. Id. For a detailed description of David Ranta's wrongful conviction and Scarcella's
misconduct,

see David Ranta, NAVL REGISTRY EXONERATIONS,

https://www.law.umich.edul

special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4127
(last
visited
Sept.
7,
2018)
[https:/perma.cc/BUU9-P5LS].
247. Frances Robles & N. R. Kleinfield, Review of 50 Brooklyn Murder Cases Ordered, N.Y.
TIMES (May 11, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/12/nyregion/doubts-about-detectivehaunt-50-murder-cases.html [https://perma.cc/AC88-CRZS].
248. Id.; Press Release, Office of the Dist. Attorney, Kings Cty., Kings Cty. Dist. Attorney
Charles J. Hynes Names 12-Member, Indep. Panel to Review Trial Convictions Involving Detective
Louis Scarella (July 1, 2013) (on file with author).
249. Alan Feuer, Another Brooklyn Murder Conviction Linked to Scarcella Is Reversed, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/11/nyregion/scarcella-murder-convictionreversed.html fhttps://perma.cc/7BFG-X8SR]. Included in the first ten murder cases overturned
were seven in which prosecutors supported defense counsels' requests to vacate the conviction and
three convictions that were vacated over prosecutors' objections. Alan Feuer, Despite 7 Scrapped
Convictions, Prosecutors Say Ex-Detective Broke No Laws, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/25/nyregion/louis-scarcella-murder-dismissals.html
[https://perma.cc/9KMZ-HC9E]. While I offer the Brooklyn District Attorney's investigation of
Scarcella's cases as a model for uncovering patterns, the investigation is partially disappointing
because it has not included investigating prosecutors who may have known about or condoned
Scarcella's misconduct. See Alan Feuer, Wrongful Convictions Are Set Right, but Few Fingers Get
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Beyond identifying patterns of misconduct for individual
Brady Violation Disclosure Letters may eventually help form
the bases for predictive models, potentially identifying factors that form
the environment in which Brady misconduct is more likely to occur. To
be clear, such models will likely not be developed soon. But the tools are
available today, and the theoretical framework is developing. 251
Furthermore, even if this effort stalls or fails, collecting a database of
instances of Brady misconduct would be a significant training resource
for prosecutors.
actors, 250

IV.

CRITIQUING

BRADY VIOLATION DISCLOSURE LETTERS

Publicly announcing Brady misconduct carries some risk, and
this proposal will undoubtedly face opposition from some prosecutors.
This Part explores those risks and the likely opposition. While it is
important to examine the risks and counterarguments, they are not
sufficiently weighty to preclude Brady Violation Disclosure Letters as a
partial remedy for prosecutorial misconduct.
A. Risks of Brady Violation DisclosureLetters
One of the reasons for implementing Brady Violation Disclosure
Letters is that the attention generated from disclosing misconduct has
the potential to increase compliance with Brady because some
prosecutors will be deterred from committing misconduct. 252 In this
light, Brady Violation Disclosure Letters are a form of punishment.
However, increasing the potential punishment for Brady violations
raises several risks.
Increasing punishment for Brady noncompliance risks pushing
the actions of the subset of prosecutors inclined to engage in misconduct
Pointed, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/08/nyregion/wrongful[https://perma.cc/JC2T-WAH6]
convictions-are-set-right-but-no-fingers-get-pointed.html
(exploring the failure to examine prosecutors' potential role in Scarcella's misconduct); Joaquin
Sapien, Watching the Detectives: Will Probe of Cop's Cases Extend to Prosecutors?,PROPUBLICA
(June 21, 2013, 9:52 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/watching-the-detectives-will-probeof-cops-cases-extend-to-prosecutors [https://perma.cc/ZD6P-8P9D] (same).
250. See FAIR PUNISHMENT PROJECT, THE RECIDIVISTS: NEW REPORT ON RATES OF
http://fairpunishment.org/new-report-on-rates-ofMISCONDUCT . (2017),
PROSECUTORIAL

prosecutorial-misconduct/ [https://perma.cc/FUD3-VH57] (documenting patterns of prosecutorial
misconduct in four jurisdictions).
251. See Wright, supra note 222, at 69-70 (identifying reforms seeking to compel prosecutors
to collect and disseminate information about their decisions to allow for increased analysis and
comparison); see also Kreag, supra note 222, at 818-20 (exploring the possible use of analytics to
predict prosecutorial misconduct).
252. See supra Part III (arguing that Brady Violation Disclosure Letters would spur
prosecutorial compliance by exposing their misdeeds to the public).
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deeper into the shadows. Under the current regime, prosecutors willing
to violate Brady can take comfort in the fact that their misconduct likely
will never he exposed. 253 Furthermore, they can predict that even if
their misconduct comes to light, they will likely face few, if any,
negative consequences. 2 5 4 The current regime is not a credible
deterrent. For prosecutors inclined to commit intentional misconduct,
the calculation may be slightly different if judges begin issuing Brady
Violation Disclosure Letters. Such announcements will deter some
prosecutors, leading them to comply with Brady.255 However, other
prosecutors may respond by becoming more effective at committing
misconduct, which means taking steps to ensure that their misconduct
remains hidden. For example, they may make conscious choices not to
reduce witness interviews to writing or record other interactions that
carry the possibility of creating exculpatory information. 256 Or they may
actively destroy or alter certain exculpatory evidence, ensuring that it
will never come to light. 2 5 7

There is a second reason why additional punishment for Brady
misconduct risks pushing misconduct further into the shadows. The
Brady misconduct in Hatchett's case only came to light when current
prosecutors agreed to review old files from his case. Without
cooperation, it is unlikely that Hatchett would have obtained the files

253. See supra notes 57, 217 (bemoaning the hidden nature of many Brady violations due to
prosecutorial discretion and power).
254. See supra Part II (portraying the penalties associated with Brady misconduct as
minimal).
255. See supra Section III.B.1 (describing the power of Brady Violation Disclosure Letters to
galvanize public sentiment against prosecutorial misconduct).
256. Cf. John G. Douglass, Confronting the Reluctant Accomplice, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1797,
1836 (2001) (recognizing that some prosecutors' witness interview practices are designed to avoid
creating discoverable material); Grunwald, supra note 47, at 776 ('Increased disclosure, for
example, may discourage some police officers from collecting or recording exculpatory evidence or
from engaging in investigative activities likely to produce it."); Grunwald, supra note 47, at 807:
[FIrom the perspective of police officers, the arrest report is "primarily an 'internal
memorandum' serving the perceived needs of the police department." Its "primary
function for the police is 'to justify the arrest and clear the case,' [which] can be achieved
by confining reports to what is necessary to satisfy the probable cause standard,
ignoring exculpatory evidence." There is also evidence that officers often fail to collect,
record, or transfer exculpatory evidence to the prosecution.
(footnotes omitted); see also Stanley Z. Fisher, "Justthe Facts, Ma'am"- Lying and the Omission of
Exculpatory Evidence in Police Reports, 28 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1, 18, 21, 30 (1993) (positing that
police reports are often intentionally devoid of exculpatory facts).
257. See, e.g., Pamela Colloff, The Innocent Man, Part Two, TEX. MONTHLY (Dec. 2012),
https://www.texasmonthly.com/articles/the-innocent-man-part-two/
[https://perma.cc/E4TVEG23] (describing efforts by Michael Morton's prosecutor to bury the exculpatory evidence before
Morton's trial); see also supra notes 183-188 and accompanying text (describing Morton's
exoneration).

2019]

DISCLOSING PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

345

needed to expose the misconduct. 258 To be certain, the current
prosecutors who helped establish Hatchett's innocence received welldeserved praise for their cooperation. But not all prosecutors will make
the same calculation. Some may see the possibility of a Brady Violation
Disclosure Letter as a reason not to cooperate with postconviction
2 59 This
attorneys reinvestigating cases for potential Brady violations.
could not only cause some Brady violations to remain hidden but it
260
could also hinder uncovering other miscarriages of justice.
Relatedly, there is a risk that increasing potential punishment
for Brady misconduct may over time change the profile and
characteristics of prosecutors. Imagine if prosecutorial immunity
vanished. 261 This would likely give pause to some aspiring prosecutors,
perhaps causing them to forgo the job altogether. This would leave a
pool of prosecutors with a higher risk tolerance. Increasing potential
punishment for Brady misconduct with Brady Violation Disclosure
Letters is not as drastic as ending prosecutorial immunity, but the
increased possibility of punishment may push some attorneys out of the
profession, leaving prosecutors' offices with more hard-charging
prosecutors who are more inclined to push the boundaries and accept
the risks.
To the extent Brady Violation Disclosure Letters are perceived
as shaming, there is also a risk that the subject of the shaming-i.e.,
the prosecutor who committed misconduct-may not have the resources
or capacity to respond to the shame and overcome it. One of the
prosecutors responsible for the misconduct against Senator Stevens is
a tragic example of the risk of shaming. 262 The prosecutor, a relatively
junior attorney in the Public Integrity Section of the Department of

258. See Levenson, supra note 15, at 547 (describing "significant impediments to
postconviction investigations," such as the lack of a "right to discovery at the postconviction stage").
259. See Levenson, supra note 31, at 366 ("Conceding a Brady violation, or allowing a peek at
the prosecutors' files to determine whether there has been a Brady violation, raises the specter
that prosecutors will lose control of their files.").
260. See Fred. C. Zacharias, The Role of Prosecutors in Serving Justice After Convictions, 58
VAND. L. REV. 171, 175 (2005) ("[O]nce appeals are complete, the prosecutor may be the only
participant in the criminal justice system in a position to rectify a wrong. Information suggesting
or probative of a wrong often is in the prosecutor's exclusive possession.").
261. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-27 (1976) (describing risks prosecutors would
face without immunity).

262. See Jeffrey Toobin, Casualties of Justice, NEW YORKER (Jan. 3, 2011),
2
[https://perma.cc/33X7https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/ 011/01/03/casualties-of-justice
who built the case committed suicide as the pressure
prosecutors
the
of
one
how
L5VR] (recounting
of the investigation into his misconduct grew); see also supraPart II (discussing Senator Stevens's
case).
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Justice, took immense pride in being a prosecutor. 263 As the allegations
grew, he questioned whether the misconduct would end his career. 264
His fears were realized when, more than a year after the case,
journalists covering another high profile, but unrelated case, led a story
with a reference to the prosecutor's work against Senator Stevens. 265
Months later, still waiting to learn whether he would face discipline for
the misconduct in Senator Stevens's case, the prosecutor committed
suicide, a decision his family attributed to the pressure he felt from the
investigation. 2 6 6 This tragic result is likely an outlier, but it nonetheless
serves as a note of caution because Brady Violation Disclosure Letters
will induce shame for some prosecutors.
Brady Violation Disclosure Letters also risk retraumatizing
victims, witnesses, and jurors. This is particularly relevant if the Brady
misconduct sent an innocent person to prison. 267 Even individuals who
did not participate in the misconduct may experience guilt for having
been a part of the process that resulted in a wrongful conviction. 268
Furthermore, some victims, witnesses, and jurors may have moved on
and may not want to be reminded of traumatic or unpleasant
experiences from being part of a criminal case.
Brady Violation Disclosure Letters also create more general
risks. For example, they risk masking other important questions about
regulating and evaluating prosecutorial decisionmaking. After all, in
most jurisdictions Brady does not apply to the overwhelming majority
of criminal convictions because they are resolved by plea bargaining. 269
In addition, Brady's protections likely have little effect on prosecutorial
charging decisions, an area where prosecutors exercise significant-and

263. See Toobin, supra note 262 (quoting the prosecutor's widow as stating, "He was really
passionate about the work he did at Public Integrity.... He felt very strongly about publiccorruption cases-that people shouldn't be doing anything illegal on the public dime.").
264. See id. (quoting the attorney who represented the prosecutor during the investigation as
stating, "He saw anything that ended with him not being a prosecutor as apocalyptically bad.").
265. See id. (recounting how the media coverage contributed to the prosecutor's feeling that
the misconduct in Senator Stevens's case had permanently tarnished his reputation); see also
Michael Cieply, Former Prosecutorof Ted Stevens Pursued Polanski, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2009),
https://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/29/former-ted-stevens-prosecutor-pursuedpolanski/ [https://perma.ccVKY6-CKWE].
266. See Toobin, supra note 262 (quoting his widow as follows: "He took his duties and his
ethical obligations very much to heart. Even thinking that his career would be over was just too
much for him. The idea that someone thought he did something wrong was just too much to bear.").
267. See Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem ofFalse Confessions in the Post-DNA
World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 959 (2004) (reporting that prosecutorial misconduct was a contributing
cause in forty-two percent of wrongful convictions).
268. See Thompson, supra note 209 (describing a rape victim's anguish upon learning that she
had misidentified her attacker and caused an innocent man to be imprisoned).
269. See supra note 225 (explaining the ubiquity of plea bargaining).
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often unreviewable-discretion. 270 Nonetheless, this Article argues that
publicly disclosing misconduct at least helps breach the opacity of the
prosecutor's office. 271 But there are limits both to the public's capacity
for monitoring public officials and to the public's attention. Given these
limits, some may argue that this Article's focus on Brady compliance is
misplaced.
B. Opposition to Brady Violation DisclosureLetters
This proposal will undoubtedly face opposition and resistance
from some prosecutors. Opponents will likely argue: (1) Brady
misconduct is rare and adequately addressed in the current regime,
(2) Brady Violation Disclosure Letters do not adequately distinguish
intentional from unintentional Brady misconduct, and (3) external
regulation of prosecutors undermines prosecutorial independence and
is unnecessary.
Admittedly, the rate of Brady misconduct is unknown, and likely
unknowable. 272 But this lack of information does not lessen the harm
caused by Brady violations when they do occur. As such, this Article
proposes adding a new tool to the existing options for responding to
prosecutorial misconduct. Some opponents will take a different path,
asserting that Brady violations are rare and not deserving of additional
attention. 273 Indeed, this was the Department of Justice's response to
calls for discovery reform following Senator Stevens's case. 2 7 4 The DOJ
argued that the misconduct did not suggest a "systemic problem," 2 75 and
asserted that of all the cases it filed in the prior ten years only 0.03
percent of them warranted review by the DOJ's internal attorney
discipline authorities for alleged discovery violations. 2 76

270. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) ("[T]he Government retains 'broad
discretion' as to whom to prosecute." (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380 n.11
(1982))).
271. See supra Section III.B.3 (describing the transparency-promoting function of Brady
Violation Disclosure letters).
272. See supranote 57 (describing the hidden nature of Brady misconduct and the difficulty of
ascertaining violation rates).
273. See, e.g., CAL. DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS'N, THE CALIFORNIA PROSECUTOR:

INTEGRITY,

INDEPENDENCE, LEADERSHIP 21 (2012), https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?
The
[hereinafter
[https://perma.cc/X6TK-KNQC]
article=1227&context=caldocs-agencies
CaliforniaProsecutor] (quoting a deputy district attorney's criticism of a report on prosecutorial
misconduct in California as follows: "[The report] rails at a problem that simply does not exist.").
274. See DOJ Statement for the Record, supra note 113, at 1 ("[T]he Department [of Justice]
does not believe that legislation is needed to address the problems that came to light in the Stevens
prosecution.").
275. Id. at 6.
276. Id. at 2.
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Many scholars disagree with the DOJ's rosy characterization of
prosecutors' Brady compliance. 2 77 They argue that the instances of
known Brady misconduct underestimate the scope of the problem.
Scholars have offered several reasons as to why it is reasonable to
conclude that the rate of misconduct is significantly higher than the
rate of convictions vacated because of Brady violations, including: the
serendipity of uncovering Brady misconduct, 278 the fact that
prosecutors commit misconduct in high-profile cases that they know
will be closely monitored, 279 the patterns of misconduct in some
prosecutors' offices, 280 and the fact that experienced prosecutors
routinely demonstrate that they do not understand their Brady
obligations. 28 1 Regardless, this argument misses the point. Even the
current rate of Brady misconduct undermines the legitimacy of the
system and demands our attention.
Admittedly, this Article advocates for Brady Violation
Disclosure Letters for both intentional and unintentional Brady
misconduct. In doing so, it matches Brady's reach, which extends
prosecutors' constitutional duty to requiring disclosure of exculpatory

277. See, e.g., GERSHMAN, supra note 55, at viii ("[A]cts of misconduct by prosecutors are
recurrent, pervasive, and very serious."); id. at xi ("A prosecutor's violation of the obligation to
disclose favorable evidence accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other type of
malpractice, but is rarely sanctioned by courts, and almost never by disciplinary bodies."); Davis,
supra note 84, at 278 ("Because it is so difficult to discover, much prosecutorial misconduct goes
unchallenged, suggesting that the problem is much more widespread than the many reported cases
of prosecutorial misconduct would indicate.").
278. See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 87 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
("Thompson discovered the prosecutors' misconduct through a serendipitous series of events.");
Juniper v. Zook, 876 F.3d 551, 559-60, 573 (4th Cir. 2017) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing
on Brady claim where exculpatory evidence was only uncovered years later when the detective's
exculpatory notes turned up after the detective was prosecuted for taking bribes from defendants
in unrelated cases); Commonwealth v. Williams, 168 A.3d 97, 103 (Pa. 2017) (exculpatory evidence
only came to light after codefendant agreed to talk because Williams's execution neared); Jones,
supranote 44, at 433 ("In the overwhelming majority of cases, the defense learns of Brady evidence
by pure accident."); Toobin, supra note 262 (outlining how the exculpatory evidence in Senator
Stevens's case came to light as a result of an FBI whistleblower inquiry).
279. See Jones, supra note 44, at 420 ("If multiple intentional Brady violations could occur
under these circumstances [in the prosecution of Senator Stevens], it is not difficult to understand
how Brady violations occur in run-of-the-mill criminal cases.").
280. See, e.g., Connick, 563 U.S. at 80 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[T]he evidence demonstrated
that misperception and disregard of Brady's disclosure requirements were pervasive in Orleans
Parish."); Zook, 876 F.3d at 566 n.7 ("We have repeatedly rebuked the Commonwealth's Attorney
and his deputies and assistants for failing to adhere to their obligations under Brady.").
281. See, e.g., Conhick, 563 U.S. at 79 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("From the top down, the
evidence showed, members of the District Attorney's Office, including the District Attorney
himself, misperceived Brady's compass and therefore inadequately attended to their disclosure
obligations."); Zook, 876 F.3d at 566 ("That Petitioner's prosecutor seems to have fundamentally
misunderstood his obligation under Brady provides further grounds to conclude that the
prosecution suppressed the Roberts materials, and potentially other exculpatory or impeaching
evidence.").
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evidence that was never a part of the prosecutor's file. 2 82 Some
prosecutors will argue that they should not face punishment for
unintentional Brady misconduct. Some prosecutors have even bristled
at the term "prosecutorial misconduct." 283 They argue that it
mischaracterizes some constitutional violations that are the result of
negligence or police misdeeds as opposed to intentional misconduct by
prosecutors. 284 They add that using the term risks confusing attorney
disciplinary authorities. 2 85 As such, prosecutors have advocated for the
more benign term prosecutorial "error" to describe Brady violations
caused by negligence. 286 Regardless of what term is used, the Supreme
Court has made clear that prosecutors are responsible for Brady
compliance and that prosecutors' mere negligence or ignorance does not
negate a Brady claim. 2 8 7 Furthermore, the harms to victims, jurors, and
witnesses are real regardless of whether prosecutors intentionally or
unintentionally violate Brady. Brady remedies should respond to these
harms.
Finally, prosecutors who view Brady Violation Disclosure
Letters as an attempt at external regulation of their disclosure
practices may also oppose this reform. In recent years, prosecutors have
opposed several attempts at external regulation. Most notably,
following the misconduct in Senator Stevens's case, several members of
288
Congress proposed new legislation to regulate disclosure practices.
The DOJ opposed the law, arguing that internal reforms were

282. See supra Part I; see also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976) ("Nor do we
believe the constitutional obligation is measured by the moral culpability, or the willfulness, of the
prosecutor.... If the suppression of evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of the
character of the evidence, not the character of the prosecutor.").
283. See, e.g., The California Prosecutor, supra note 273, at 7 (criticizing a multiyear report
evaluating prosecutorial misconduct for "fail[ing] to make the distinction between error and
misconduct").

284. See id. at 18 ("While willfully withholding exculpatory evidence constitutes Brady error,
so does the inadvertent failure to disclose the evidence.").
285. See Joseph Charles Hynes, Resolution 100B, 2010 A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. SEC. 1,
http://apps.americanbar.org/yldlannual10/100B.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GNC-T3M6]
("Nevertheless, a finding of 'prosecutorial misconduct' may be perceived as reflecting intentional
wrongdoing, or even professional misconduct, even in cases where such a perception is entirely
unwarranted ....

).

286. Id. at 6 ("It addresses and urges trial and appellate courts reviewing the conduct of
prosecutors, while assuring that a defendant's rights are fully protected, to use the term 'error'
where it more accurately characterizes that conduct than the term 'prosecutorial misconduct.'").
287. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110 ("If evidence highly probative of innocence is in his file, he
should be presumed to recognize its significance even if he has actually overlooked it. . . . If the
suppression of evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of the character of the
evidence, not the character of the prosecutor.").
288. See Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act, S. 2197, 112th Cong. (2012) (seeking to impose
heightened disclosure requirements upon prosecutors).
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sufficient. 289 This Article does not oppose internal reforms, but they are
not enough. More importantly, they do not remedy the range of harms
caused by past Brady misconduct that has yet to be uncovered.
CONCLUSION

Brady violations are a complex problem that cause multifaceted
harms. These harms reach beyond defendants to include harms to
victims, jurors, witnesses, and other stakeholders in the criminal justice
system. To date, Brady remedies only partially respond to the harms to
defendants and largely ignore the harms to people other than
defendants. Nonetheless, some judges are willing to attempt to
aggressively root out Brady noncompliance. These judges and others
should be receptive to a flexible remedy that they can implement
immediately. Brady Violation Disclosure Letters partially vindicate the
range of harms caused by Brady misconduct and promise to lead to
increased Brady compliance. They will not end Brady misconduct. But
they are a step in the right direction. Furthermore, because they can be
adopted by individual judges without formal changes to rules or
statutes, even ad hoc adoption of this proposal may cause other judges
to follow, much the same way that Judge Sullivan's adoption of a
standing pretrial Brady order has spread throughout federal trial
courts. When this happens, we can expect the increased attention on
prosecutorial misconduct to lead to increased compliance with Brady.

289. See DOJ Statement for the Record, supra note 113, at 1 ("In light of these internal
reforms, the Department does not believe that legislation is needed to address the problems that
came to light in the Stevens prosecution.").
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APPENDIX

SAMPLE BRADY DISCLOSURE LETTER FOR HATCHETT'S CASE

Kings County Supreme Court
Clerk of Court
Re: People v. Hatchett
Dear Juror:
In 1992 you served as a juror in People v. Hatchett. The jury
found Hatchett guilty of murder, and the court sentenced Hatchett to a
term of twenty-five years to life in prison.
Recently, the court vacated Hatchett's murder conviction
because the prosecution violated his constitutional rights during the
trial in which you served as a juror. Specifically, before Hatchett's trial,
the prosecution had a constitutional obligation to provide Hatchett any
evidence in the prosecution's possession or control that was favorable to
Hatchett so long as that evidence met a certain threshold level of
importance. That is, the prosecutor's constitutional duty did not extend
to all evidence favorable to the defendant (including evidence of trivial
weight) but only to favorable evidence of sufficient significance such
that the prosecution's nondisclosure of the evidence undermines the
court's confidence in the reliability of Hatchett's conviction. This
constitutional obligation to disclose favorable evidence to defendants
before trial is outlined in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), a case
the United States Supreme Court decided in 1963. The constitutional
right is designed to ensure that defendants receive a fair trial and to
protect the integrity of our criminal justice system.
The prosecution's case against Hatchett heavily relied on the
testimony of a man who claimed to have witnessed the murder. At trial,
the prosecution presented evidence that the eyewitness identified
Hatchett as the person he saw commit the crime. However, the
prosecution failed to disclose to Hatchett or the jury that just days
earlier the eyewitness positively identified someone other than
Hatchett as the perpetrator. The prosecution also failed to disclose to
Hatchett or the jury that the eyewitness smoked crack cocaine in the
hours before the crime, potentially inhibiting his ability to accurately
perceive the crime.

352

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1:297

The prosecutor's omissions implicate a violation of the
defendant's constitutional rights. This constitutional violation requires
an erasure of Hatchett's conviction and renders void the trial in which
you served as a juror. Furthermore, prosecutors have elected not to
retry Hatchett for the murder. While prosecutors are permitted to retry
Hatchett with a new jury that would hear the favorable evidence the
prosecutors concealed at the trial in which you served as a juror, they
have elected not to do so. In light of the new evidence that supports
Hatchett's innocence, prosecutors concluded that there was no longer
sufficient evidence supporting Hatchett's guilt to warrant an attempt
to convince a jury that he committed the murder.
The Clerk of Court sent a copy of this letter to each of the jurors
from Hatchett's trial. The Clerk of Court also sent a copy of this letter
to the witnesses from Hatchett's trial, the police officers who
investigated the crime, the victim's family members, the Brooklyn
District Attorney, the Legal Aid Society, Brooklyn Defender Services,
the New York Police Department, and the New York Office of Victim
Services.
You are under no obligation to take any action based on
receiving this letter. Rather, the letter is being sent to you solely to
update you on the status of Hatchett's case. The court is grateful for
your service and regrets that Hatchett's initial trial was corrupted by
the prosecutor's misconduct.

